



*On 27 October 2019, this decision was referred to the Financial Markets Tribunal (ref. FMT 19007).*

*On 27 October 2020, the FMT issued its decision in respect of the reference. The FMT's decision is published on the FMT section of the DFSA's website.*

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## DECISION NOTICE

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**To:** Mr. Nrupaditya Singhdeo

**Address:**



**Date:** 25 September 2019

### DECISION

1. For the reasons given in this Notice, the DFSA has decided that Mr. Nrupaditya Singhdeo (**Mr. Singhdeo**) contravened legislation administered by the DFSA. As a result, the DFSA imposes on Mr. Singhdeo:
  - (1) a prohibition from holding office in or being an employee of any Authorised Person, DNFBP, Reporting Entity or Domestic Fund, pursuant to Article 90(2)(g) of the Regulatory Law 2004 (the **Regulatory Law**) (the **Prohibition**); and
  - (2) a fine of US\$ 150,000, pursuant to Article 90(2)(a) of the Regulatory Law (the **Fine**).

### SUMMARY OF REASONS

2. Al Masah Capital Management Limited (**Al Masah DIFC**) is a firm authorised by the DFSA. Al Masah DIFC is a subsidiary of Al Masah Capital Limited (**Al Masah Cayman**), a Cayman Islands exempted company, which was not authorised by the DFSA to carry on any Financial Services in or from the DIFC.
3. Al Masah Cayman established and managed four exempted companies incorporated in the Cayman Islands, through which investors were able to invest in private equity in a number of sectors. Those companies (the **Investment Companies**) were Foreign Funds as defined in Article 13 of the Collective Investment Law 2010 (**CIL**). Each Investment Company held shares in a subsidiary (the **Operational Company**) incorporated in the UAE.

4. Mr. Singhdeo was at all material times the Senior Finance Officer (**SFO**) of Al Masah DIFC and the chief financial officer of Al Masah Cayman. Between 27 September 2010 and 27 April 2016, Mr. Singhdeo was an Authorised Individual approved by the DFSA to perform the Licensed Functions of Finance Officer and Senior Manager at Al Masah DIFC. Mr. Singhdeo voluntarily withdrew his Authorised Individual status after the commencement of the investigation. Mr. Singhdeo was also secretary to the boards of directors of Al Masah Cayman and Al Masah DIFC, and a member of the board of directors of each of the Investment Companies.
5. The DFSA has decided that, during the Relevant Period, Al Masah DIFC committed the following contraventions of DFSA administered laws or Rules:
  - (1) making misleading or deceptive statements as to fees in documents relating to Offers of Units in Funds managed by Al Masah Cayman, contrary to Article 56(2) of CIL and (after 21 August 2014) Article 41B(1) of the Regulatory Law; and
  - (2) when communicating Marketing Materials and Subscription Forms to investors, failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that the information contained in those documents as to fees was clear, fair and not misleading, contrary to COB Rule 3.2.1 and GEN Rule 4.2.6.
6. The DFSA has also decided that, during the Relevant Period, Al Masah Cayman committed contraventions of DFSA administered laws or Rules in making misleading or deceptive statements as to fees in documents relating to Offers of Units in Funds managed by Al Masah Cayman, contrary to Articles 56(1)(a) and (b) and 56(2) of CIL and (after 21 August 2014) Article 41B(1) of the Regulatory Law.
7. Given his involvement in the relevant facts and matters set out in this Notice describing the contraventions by Al Masah DIFC and Al Masah Cayman, and by reason of his roles at those firms, the DFSA has decided that Mr. Singhdeo was knowingly concerned in the alleged contraventions by Al Masah DIFC and Al Masah Cayman and thus under Article 86(1) of the Regulatory Law, he committed contraventions of legislation administered by the DFSA.
8. The DFSA has further decided that, in December 2014, Mr. Singhdeo contravened Article 41B of the Regulatory Law in counselling or procuring or being knowingly involved in the alteration of a bank statement to conceal the payment of Placement Fees, from, or the source of funds transferred into, a bank account of Al Najah Education Limited (**ANEL**).

9. The DFSA has decided that Mr. Singhdeo, in his capacity as an Authorised Individual, failed to observe high standards of integrity and fair dealing in carrying out his Licensed Function in breach of GEN Rule 4.4.1 (Principle 1 of the Principles for Authorised Individuals).
10. In the light of his serious misconduct and the contraventions set out in this Notice, the DFSA has decided that Mr. Singhdeo is not fit and proper to perform any function in connection with provision of Financial Services in or from the DIFC and it is appropriate and necessary to take the action specified in this Notice to maintain the integrity and reputation, and to protect direct and indirect users, of the DIFC.

## **DEFINITIONS**

11. Defined terms are identified in this Notice by the capitalisation of the initial letter of a word or of each word in a phrase, and are defined either in this Notice or in the DFSA Rulebook, Glossary Module (**GLO**). Some of these defined terms are set out in Annex C. The Relevant Period for all the matters referred to in this Notice is from August 2010 to June 2016.

## FACTS AND MATTERS RELIED UPON

### Structure

12. Al Masah DIFC was incorporated in the DIFC on 9 August 2010 and licensed by the DFSA on 19 August 2010. During the Relevant Period Al Masah DIFC was authorised by the DFSA to carry on Financial Services in or from the DIFC, including Arranging Deals in Investments and Managing a Collective Investment Fund.
13. Al Masah DIFC is a subsidiary of Al Masah Cayman. Al Masah Cayman was incorporated in the Cayman Islands as an exempt company on 8 October 2009. Al Masah Cayman was not authorised by the DFSA to carry on any Financial Services in or from the DIFC.
14. Al Masah Cayman established four Investment Companies, which were exempted companies incorporated in the Cayman Islands, each holding shares in a subsidiary (the **Operational Company**) incorporated in the UAE. The Investment Companies, which were described by Al Masah Cayman as private equity platforms, and the Operational Companies are listed in Table 1.

<b>PLATFORM</b>	<b>OPERATIONAL COMPANY</b>	<b>INVESTMENT COMPANY</b>
Healthcare Fund	Alchemist Healthcare LLC	Avivo Group
Education Fund	Al Najah Education LLC	Al Najah Education Limited ( <b>ANEL</b> )
Logistics Fund	Gulf Pinnacle Investments LLC	Gulf Pinnacle Logistics Limited
Lifestyle Fund	DLL Emirates Restaurants LLC	Diamond Lifestyle Limited

15. Each Operational Company invested in businesses and assets within a particular sector of the economy, primarily through the acquisition of unlisted companies.
16. Al Masah DIFC operated from premises it leased, and shared with Al Masah Cayman at Level 6, North Tower, Emirates Financial Towers, DIFC and Level 9, Suite 906 & 907, ETA Star – Liberty House, DIFC.
17. During the Relevant Period substantially the same persons served as the boards of directors of Al Masah DIFC and Al Masah Cayman respectively. The senior management of Al Masah DIFC and Al Masah Cayman included:

(1) Mr. Singhdeo who was the chief financial officer of Al Masah Cayman and authorised by the DFSA to perform the Licensed Functions of Finance Officer and

Senior Manager at AI Masah DIFC in the period from 27 September 2010 to 27 April 2016. Mr. Singhdeo was also secretary to the boards of directors of both AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC and a member of the board of directors of each of the Investment Companies;

(2) Mr. Shailesh Dash who, from 19 August 2010 was authorised by the DFSA to perform the Licensed Functions of Senior Executive Officer and Licensed Director at AI Masah DIFC. Mr. Dash was also on the board of directors of AI Masah Cayman and chairman of the board of directors of each of the Investment Companies; and

(3) Mr. Don Lim Jung Chiat who was not authorised by the DFSA to carry on any Licensed Functions, but was an executive director of AI Masah Cayman and on the board of directors of each of the Investment Companies.

18. Under a service fee agreement dated 15 January 2011 AI Masah DIFC was to receive, in a client bank account, money from clients of AI Masah Cayman, on which a service fee of 2% of money received would be payable to AI Masah DIFC. Under an investment advisory agreement dated 1 April 2012 AI Masah Cayman was to pay a fee, limited to 75% of the total expenses of AI Masah DIFC, towards common expenses shared for managing their businesses. Under an advisory agreement, as amended on 28 June 2012, AI Masah Cayman was to pay to AI Masah DIFC an advisory fee equivalent to 90% of the total revenues earned by AI Masah Cayman as management fees or other direct fees. Under an agreement dated 31 December 2012 it was recorded that all employment contracts were entered into with AI Masah Cayman. The costs of all employees in the DIFC were to be shared as to 75% for AI Masah Cayman, and 25% for AI Masah DIFC. Salaries were to be paid by AI Masah DIFC and employment visas issued in the name of AI Masah DIFC.

19. As evidenced by the investor relations team manual:

(1) AI Masah DIFC was the main operation office of the AI Masah Group, of which AI Masah Cayman was the holding company;

(2) employees in the Dubai office should present themselves as working for AI Masah DIFC; and

(3) introduction of referral agents, client on-boarding and the compliance function was to be carried out by the investor relations team in the office of AI Masah DIFC.

20. The effect of these arrangements was that the businesses and activities of both AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC were carried on together in the DIFC. In dealing with investors and communicating Marketing Material, directors and employees were acting both for AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman, and their acts and omissions may be attributed to either company depending on the circumstances.
21. During the Relevant Period, the activities of AI Masah Cayman in relation to marketing, making arrangements for the sale of shares in the Investment Companies, and in managing the Investment Companies were mainly carried on in and from the DIFC, where all its directors and senior employees were based. AI Masah Cayman did not carry on any significant business from its registered office in the Cayman Islands.

#### *Management and placement agreements*

22. Each Investment Company entered into a separate management agreement with AI Masah Cayman in substantially the same terms (the **Management Agreements**). The Management Agreements recited that AI Masah Cayman provided asset and portfolio management services to investors in the MENA region, and appointed AI Masah Cayman to act as manager of the Investment Company. The agreement provided that the manager should have overall direction, supervision and ultimate control of all matters pertaining to the operations of the business and do all things necessary to provide a profitable exit for all investors in the company. The Investment Company agreed to pay to AI Masah Cayman an annual management fee of 2% of total equity employed.
23. AI Masah Cayman also entered into a placement fee agreement with each of the Investment Companies, in substantially the same terms (the **Placement Fee Agreements**). Under the Placement Fee Agreements the Investment Company engaged AI Masah Cayman to help it raise equity capital at a premium to its par value and agreed to pay to AI Masah Cayman a Placement Fee of up to 10% of the capital raised from new investors, to be payable to AI Masah Cayman when the Investment Company received the subscription payment from a new investor.

#### *Marketing to prospective investors*

24. Between 2012 and 2016 AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman communicated Marketing Material to prospective investors in the Investment Companies by various means including by email, personal delivery or through the website of AI Masah Cayman ([www.almasahcapital.com](http://www.almasahcapital.com)).

25. The Marketing Material communicated or made available to prospective investors included the following classes of documents:

(1) investor presentations which included an overview of the businesses and assets under management, financial projections, terms of subscription for the shares on offer, anticipated returns for the investor, the management fees charged and the fee payable by the investor to AI Masah Cayman on exit;

(2) short summaries of investor presentations which included financial projections, terms of subscription for the shares on offer, anticipated returns for the investor, the management fees charged and the fee payable by the investor to AI Masah Cayman on exit; and

(3) annual reports for AI Masah Cayman and the Investment Companies.

The Marketing Material also included financial projections which did not include any disclosure of fees.

26. Prior to 2015, the Marketing Material was sent by the investor relations team to prospective investors by email. From early 2015, the Marketing Material was also uploaded onto a portal on the website of AI Masah Cayman and prospective investors were provided with a username and password with which to access the material on the portal.

27. In addition to this and throughout the Relevant Period, Marketing Materials were also delivered in person by AI Masah DIFC employees to potential investors.

28. In addition to direct marketing AI Masah Cayman entered into agreements with referral agents (or distribution partners) to distribute securities issued by the AI Masah Cayman Group. The referral agent agreed to use only the Marketing Material provided by the AI Masah Cayman Group. The fees payable by AI Masah Cayman were stated to be up to 5% of the amounts raised towards the share capital of the Investment Companies and, in respect of subsequent investments by introduced clients, a percentage of the management fees to be earned by AI Masah Cayman.

29. The relevant Marketing Material on which the DFSA relies is listed in Annex C. In many cases the Marketing Material purports to have been distributed by AI Masah DIFC on behalf of AI Masah Cayman. In a few cases the Marketing Material purports to have been distributed by AI Masah Cayman and approved by AI Masah DIFC.

30. The terms in which fees were disclosed in the Marketing Material were by reference to the Subscription Form stating that Al Masah Cayman as manager would be charging a 2% management fee per annum from the capital of the Investment Company, and charging the investor 20% on any returns exceeding an internal rate of return of 10%.
31. The Subscription Forms which contained the contract between the investor and the Investment Company and Al Masah Cayman contained the following terms:
- (1) an acknowledgement that the investor had received and read an offering presentation of the company;
  - (2) an application for shares at a stated issue price;
  - (3) an acknowledgment that Al Masah Cayman as manager would receive an annual management fee of 2% of the equity of the company;
  - (4) an agreement to pay on exit to Al Masah Cayman an incentive fee equal to 20% of the returns received by the investor, provided that the return net of the incentive fee yielded an internal rate of return of at least 10% per annum from the period of investment;
  - (5) an agreement by the investor to be bound by the memorandum and articles of association of the company; and
  - (6) a term granting Al Masah Cayman a voting rights proxy in respect of the shares.

The Subscription Forms were counter-signed on behalf of Al Masah Cayman.

*ANEL annual reports and financial statements for 2013 & 2014*

32. On or about 29 August 2013, Mr. Singhdeo, as a “director” of Al Masah DIFC, signed an engagement letter with Ernst & Young (the **Auditors**) to perform an audit of the financial statements of Al Najah Education LLC (**ANEL**) and its subsidiaries for the period 17 October 2011 to 31 August 2013.
33. After 31 March 2014, the board of directors of ANEL, including Mr. Singhdeo, approved its audited financial statements for the year ended 31 August 2013. Those audited financial statements correctly disclosed in the notes related party transactions with Al Masah Cayman, including management fees of US\$460,157 and advisory fees and other costs of US\$6,507,182, which consisted mainly of the Placement Fees paid. The Auditors had required that the audited financial statements disclose the payment by

ANEL of placement fees, as transaction costs, in order to comply with IFRS. The report of the directors was signed by Mr. Lim and Mr. Singhdeo and dated 31 March 2014.

34. The 2013 annual report of ANEL, produced for communication to shareholders and prospective investors, purported to include the audited financial statements for the year ended 31 August 2013, including the Auditors' report to shareholders and the signature of two directors, Mr. Bukhamseen and Mr. Singhdeo, certifying that those statements had been approved by the board on 31 March 2014. However, notes 7 and 10 to those financial statements, although disclosing management fees of US\$460,157, had been altered so as not to disclose advisory fees and the other costs of US\$6,507,182. The purpose and effect of the purportedly audited financial statements as so altered was to conceal from shareholders and prospective investors the Placement Fees paid by ANEL to Al Masah Cayman.
35. On about 5 May 2015, the board of directors of ANEL, including Mr. Singhdeo, approved its audited financial statements for the year ended 31 August 2014. The report of the directors was signed by Mr. Singhdeo and Mr. Lim and dated 5 May 2015. Those audited financial statements correctly disclosed in the notes related party transactions with Al Masah Cayman for 2013 and 2014, including advisory fees. In the 2014 annual report those financial statements had again been altered so as to conceal from shareholders and prospective investors the Placement Fees paid by ANEL to Al Masah Cayman. The altered financial statements appearing in the 2014 annual report were also signed by Mr. Singhdeo and Mr. Lim.
36. Production of the 2013 and 2014 annual reports of ANEL was co-ordinated in the offices of Al Masah DIFC by its employees for communication to the shareholders of and prospective investors in ANEL. Physical copies of annual reports were delivered to and stored at Al Masah DIFC's offices. Al Masah DIFC has not disputed that such reports were communicated to shareholders of ANEL, and emails show that such reports were also communicated by Al Masah DIFC to distributors or prospective investors, including the following:
  - (1) On 8 July 2014, Mr. Lim sent an email to a prospective investor (**Investor A**), copied to Mr. Singhdeo (and Mr. Dash), attaching a copy of the 2013 annual report for ANEL, falsely representing that the report contained the audited financial statements of ANEL. Mr. Singhdeo did not take any steps to clarify or otherwise correct this position following his receipt of that email.

- (2) On 24 November 2014, an employee of AI Masah DIFC, on the instructions of Mr. Lim, emailed the 2013 annual report of ANEL to a distributor (**Distributor B**) interested in distributing the Healthcare and Education funds. That email was sent in response to a request for copies of audited financial statements for carrying out due diligence for the funds and AI Masah Cayman. Again, Mr. Singhdeo was included in the relevant email exchanges at the time but did not oppose the proposal to send Distributor B the annual report instead of the audited financial statements.
37. The ANEL financial statements for 2013, falsified as set out at paragraph 34 above, were also communicated by AI Masah DIFC as follows:
- (1) On 17 December 2014, Mr. Lim sent an email to a firm of financial advisers, copied to Mr. Singhdeo, in response to a request for the audited financial statements of ANEL, attaching a copy of the falsified financial statements, describing those statements as the audited financials for ANEL for the 2013 financial year. Again, Mr. Singhdeo was included in the relevant email exchanges at the time but did not correct the misleading description of what was provided as being the “audited statements”;
- (2) On 17 March 2015, Mr. Lim sent an email to an intermediary bank, copied to Mr. Singhdeo (and Mr. Dash), attaching a copy of the falsified financial statements for provision to a prospective investor (**Investor C**), describing the document as the audited financial statements for ANEL for the 2013 financial year.

*Misleading Investor A as to Placement Fee income received by AI Masah Cayman*

38. On 10 September 2014, a member of the placement team employed by AI Masah DIFC emailed to Investor A information about the fee income of AI Masah Cayman, in response to a query which had been raised in relation to the figure of US\$14.3 million disclosed as fee income from assets under management in the audited financial statements of AI Masah Cayman for the year ended 31 March 2014. That email falsely represented that the fees that pertained to the private equity platform were only management fees of US\$4.7 million, and concealed that there were also Placement Fees in excess of US\$5 million which were not included in the information disclosed. This concealment of Placement Fee income received was known to Mr. Lim and had been approved by Mr. Singhdeo and Mr. Dash.

*Collective Investment Funds*

39. Each of the Investment Companies was a Collective Investment Fund (a **Fund**) as defined in Article 11 of CIL.
40. The relevant arrangements, as contained in and evidenced by the Subscription Forms and the investor presentation or offering document referred to in the Subscription Forms, were made with respect to property including shares in unlisted companies acquired by an Operational Company and Real Property. The investor presentation or offering document described the assets to be held by the Operational Company, the projected returns for investors and the exit strategy.
41. The purpose or effect of such arrangements was to enable investors, by acquiring shares in an Investment Company, to participate in or receive profits or income from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property referred to above, or sums paid out of such profits or income to the Investment Company.
42. The investors did not have day-to-day control over the management of the property referred to above. Under Article 11(1) of CIL the investors who are to participate in the arrangements are Unitholders.
43. The contributions of the investors and the profits or income out of which payments were to be made to them were pooled in the accounts of the Investment Company, and the property referred to above was managed as a whole by or on behalf of Al Masah Cayman.
44. Under the terms of the subscription agreement, Al Masah Cayman was legally accountable to investors for the management of the Investment Company, including shares in companies held by the Operational Company, and established, managed or otherwise operated the Investment Company, so that under Article 20(2) of CIL, Al Masah Cayman was the person managing each Investment Company. Under Article 11(1)(c)(ii) of CIL, Al Masah Cayman was a Fund Manager.
45. The Investment Companies did not fall within the exclusion from Article 11 of CIL set out at CIR Rule 2.1.10 which provides:

*“An arrangement does not constitute a Collective Investment Fund if the arrangement comprises a closed-ended Partnership or Body Corporate, unless on reasonable grounds the purpose or effect of such an arrangement appears to be the investment*

*management, in the exercise of discretion for a collective purpose, of Investments or Real Property assets for the benefit of the shareholders or partners.”*

46. The purpose or effect of the arrangements referred to at paragraphs 40 to 44 above appears to the DFSA on reasonable grounds to have been the investment management, in the exercise of discretion for a collective purpose, of Investments, that is Shares in the Operational Company or in companies acquired by the Operational Company and Real Property owned by the Investment Company, the Operational Company or its subsidiaries, for the benefit of shareholders in an Investment Company. In reaching that finding the DFSA has taken into account:
- (1) the Marketing Material referred to at paragraph 25 above;
  - (2) the terms of the Subscription Forms in providing for an incentive fee based on the returns generated on an investment in the Investment Company;
  - (3) the assets overview, exit strategy and financial returns described in the Marketing Material;
  - (4) the private equity overview dated February 2015 which describes the role of Al Masah Cayman in managing through four platforms 65 private equity investments through controlling stakes in small- to mid-cap companies, to create value on exit; and
  - (5) that the business model of Al Masah Cayman falls within the definition of a Private Equity Fund at CIR Rule 3.1.6 through its investment in unlisted companies by means of Shares or otherwise.
47. Each of the funds was a Foreign Fund as defined in Article 13 of CIL as the Investment Companies were not established or domiciled in the DIFC and were not External Funds as defined in Article 14 of CIL, as they were not managed by a Fund Manager that was an Authorised Firm.
48. As defined in Schedule 1 of CIL, the rights or interests of the investors participating in the arrangements set out at paragraphs 40 to 44 above were Units. The Subscription Forms, which formed part of the Marketing Material, set out the contractual basis for the prospective investor's investment and constituted an Offer of a Unit of a Fund to a prospective or existing Unitholder under Article 13 of CIL.

49. Under Article 19 of CIL the Offer of Units in the Funds contained in the Subscription Forms was made by the Investment Company offering shares and by AI Masah Cayman, which had made arrangements for the issue of shares, on whose behalf the Subscription Form was signed, which managed the placement for the Investment Company, and whose fees were agreed under the Subscription Form.

*Misleading and deceptive statements in relation to fees*

50. The Marketing Material referred to in Annex D, and the Subscription Forms, were communicated to prospective investors by AI Masah DIFC acting on behalf of AI Masah Cayman.

51. The statements made in the Marketing Material, and the Subscription Forms, as to the fees to be paid out of the share capital of the Investment Company or to be received by AI Masah Cayman were misleading, deceptive and not fair to investors in that:

- (1) the disclosure of annual management fees, payable out of the assets of the Investment Company to AI Masah Cayman, impliedly represented that there were no other fees arising from the capital subscription made by the investor to be paid by the Investment Company to AI Masah Cayman; and
- (2) the Placement Fees of up to 10% of the capital subscription to be made by the investor and payable to AI Masah Cayman were more material to an investor's decision to invest than the annual management fees.

52. Further, the following points are relevant to assessing knowledge and intention in relation to the statements described in paragraph 51 above:

- (1) the disclosure of annual management fees demonstrates that AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman appreciated that the payment of substantial fees from the Investment Company to AI Masah Cayman in respect of the investment to be made by the investor would be material to the investment decision;
- (2) the fact that the Placement Fees were not disclosed in any of the Marketing Material or Subscription Forms demonstrates that the omission of the reference to Placement Fees was not inadvertent but a deliberate policy;
- (3) the facts referred to at paragraphs 34 to 38 above corroborate the finding that the omission of Placement Fees from the fees disclosed in the Marketing Material was a deliberate policy; and

- (4) contrary to statements made to the DFSA at interview, Mr. Singhdeo personally sent Subscription Forms and other Marketing Material to investors and potential investors.
53. Al Masah DIFC acting on behalf of Al Masah Cayman also communicated to shareholders of ANEL and to prospective investors:
- (1) the 2013 and 2014 annual reports of ANEL containing the falsified financial statements of ANEL for 2013 and 2014;
  - (2) the falsified 2013 financial statements of ANEL; and
  - (3) the false information sent to Investor A as to Placement Fee income received by Al Masah Cayman,
- as set out at paragraphs 34 to 38 above.
54. Those annual reports and financial statements were misleading, deceptive and not fair to investors in deliberately concealing the Placement Fees paid to Al Masah Cayman, in the circumstances set out at (1) and (2) at paragraph 51 above, and in falsely representing that the financial statements included in the annual reports complied with applicable accounting standards and were those which had been approved by the board of directors, audited by the Auditors and were subject to the Auditors' report.
55. Mr. Singhdeo engaged in discussions with the Auditors about removing all references to the Placement Fees paid to Al Masah Cayman from the financial statements. He was advised by the Auditors that the payments must appear in the financial statements.
56. The false information sent to Investor A was communicated to a prospective investor in the context of discussions about the valuation of investments in the Investment Companies. The email was misleading, deceptive and not fair to investors for the reasons given at paragraph 38 above. Mr. Singhdeo was directly involved in the production of the false information.

*Alteration of a copy of a bank statement*

57. On 19 September 2014, the financial controller of ANEL raised with Mr Lim the difficulty of reconciling entries in an ANEL bank account at Royal Bank of Canada (Suisse) SA (the **RBC Account**) with other accounts and transactions. Mr Lim told him to alter the bank statements. On or about 9 December 2014 the financial controller, acting on the instructions of Mr Singhdeo and Mr. Lim, deleted entries and made alterations to a copy bank statement relating to the period 15 August 2013 to 29 October 2013. The effect of the deletions and alterations was to disguise the origin of funds paid into the RBC Account and to conceal the payment of Placement Fees into the account and transfers out of the account. Mr. Singhdeo was sent copies of the genuine bank statement and the alteration and asked to comment on the differences in the physical appearance of the statement. Mr. Singhdeo responded to this request with a query about why some payments to ANEL from an investor were still appearing in the bank statement, by implication requiring that further alterations be made. Mr Singhdeo also received two emails from Mr Lim commenting on the appearance of the altered copy. Mr. Singhdeo thereby counselled or procured or was knowingly involved in the alteration.
58. Copies of the falsified bank statement were found in a folder relating to ANEL audit documents. The purpose of preparing the altered bank statement was to make it available to be viewed by the auditors of ANEL, in the event they requested access to bank statements.

*Knowingly concerned*

59. Mr. Singhdeo was knowingly concerned in the contraventions committed by AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman which are referred to at paragraphs 5 and 6 above.
60. Mr. Singhdeo as the SFO of AI Masah DIFC, chief financial officer of AI Masah Cayman, member of the board of each of the Investment Companies, and a member of the audit committee of ANEL, knew of the arrangements made under the Placement Fee Agreements under which Placement Fees of up to 10% of capital raised from new investors were payable to AI Masah Cayman, and the amount of such fees received during the Relevant Period.
61. Mr. Singhdeo was personally involved in steps taken to conceal information which might have disclosed the payment of Placement Fees from the Investment Companies to AI Masah Cayman as follows:
  - (1) as a member of the board and audit committee of ANEL, Mr. Singhdeo was actively involved in the preparation of the 2013 and 2014 annual reports. Mr. Singhdeo was aware of the correct figures in the audited financial statements which had been approved by the Board and signed by him, and that the financial statements in the 2013 and 2014 annual reports, which were also signed by him, did not correspond with the audited financial statement or with IFRS and had been falsified so as not to disclose the payment of Placement Fees;
  - (2) the false and deceptive information to be sent to investor A was the subject of discussion with and approval by Mr. Singhdeo; and
  - (3) the sending of the 2013 ANEL annual report to Distributor B, instead of the audited financial statements requested which would have disclosed Placement Fee income, was reported to Mr. Singhdeo.

62. By clear inference from the facts set out above Mr. Singhdeo knew that the Placement Fees payable to AI Masah Cayman had not been disclosed to prospective investors in the Marketing Material or offer documents provided prior to investment.
63. The annual reports for ANEL had been produced and distributed without the knowledge or approval of the Auditors. At a meeting with Mr. Singhdeo and Mr. Lim held on about 22 November 2015 the Auditors required ANEL to withdraw the annual reports, and write to shareholders notifying them of the material omissions and discrepancies in the financial statements contained in the annual reports and the audited financial statements.
64. Instead, investors received an email drafted by Mr. Singhdeo and Mr. Lim describing the reason for the retraction of the financial statements as “*printing errors*”. Mr. Singhdeo had been directly involved in the discussion with the Auditors about the retraction, and was aware that the changes to the financial statements were deliberate and could not reasonably be described as printing errors.

## **CONTRAVENTIONS**

65. Having regard to the facts and matters set out in this Notice, the DFSA has decided that Mr. Singhdeo committed the contraventions set out below.

### *Involvement in the contraventions by AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman*

66. Article 86(1) of the Regulatory Law provides that if a person is knowingly concerned in a contravention of the Law or Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA committed by another, the aforementioned person commits a contravention and is liable to be proceeded against and dealt with accordingly.
67. Article 86(7) of the Regulatory Law provides that a person is ‘knowingly concerned’ in a contravention if, and only if, the person:
- (1) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention;
  - (2) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention;
  - (3) has in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, been knowingly involved in or been party to the contravention; or
  - (4) has conspired with another or others to effect the contravention.

68. By reason of the facts set out at paragraphs 60 to 64 above, Mr. Singhdeo aided or abetted or was knowingly involved in or a party to the contraventions set out at paragraphs 69 to 82 below and under Article 86(1) of the Regulatory Law is liable accordingly.

*Misleading or deceptive statements by AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC in relation to Funds*

69. Article 56(1) of CIL prohibits a person from making an Offer of Units if there is a misleading or deceptive statement in any document that relates to the Offer, or an omission from any such document of information that is necessary to make a statement not misleading or deceptive.
70. As set out in paragraphs 49 to 56 above, AI Masah Cayman contravened Article 56(1) of CIL by making an Offer of Units in Funds in circumstances where documents relating to the Offer contained misleading or deceptive statements.
71. Article 56(2) of CIL prohibits a person, in or from the DIFC, from making a misleading or deceptive statement in relation to a Fund or in connection with an Offer of Units, whether in the DIFC or elsewhere.
72. As set out in paragraphs 50 to 56 above, AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC caused misleading, deceptive and unfair statements to be made in relation to a Fund or in connection with an Offer of Units of a Fund. As a result, AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC contravened Article 56(2) of CIL.

*Contravention by AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC of the general prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct*

73. Article 41B of the Regulatory Law (in force from 21 August 2014 onwards) prohibits a person from, in or from the DIFC, engaging in conduct in connection with a Financial Product or a Financial Service that is:
- (1) misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive;
  - (2) fraudulent; or
  - (3) dishonest.
74. GEN Rule 2A.1.1 specifies that a Financial Product includes an Investment (which includes a Security such as a Share or a Unit).

75. Under GEN Rule 2.2.1 an activity constitutes a Financial Service if it is an activity specified in GEN Rule 2.2.2 and the activity is carried on by way of business in the manner described in GEN section 2.3. Under GEN Rule 2.2.2, the activities specified include “Arranging Deals in Investments” and “Managing a Collective Investment Fund”.
76. “Arranging Deals in Investments” is defined in GEN Rule 2.9.1 as making arrangements with a view to another Person buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting an Investment (whether that other Person is acting as principal or agent). The definition is specified to include arrangements which do not bring about the transaction and arrangements comprising or involving the receipt and transmission of Client orders in relation to Investments.
77. “Managing a Collective Investment Fund” is defined in GEN Rule 2.12.1 as:
- (1) being legally accountable to the Unitholders in the Fund for the management of the property held for or within the Fund under the Fund’s Constitution; and
  - (2) establishing, managing or otherwise operating or winding up a Collective Investment Fund.
78. By reason of the facts set out at paragraphs 21 and 23, Al Masah Cayman was carrying on the Financial Service of Arranging Deals in Investments in or from the DIFC. By reason of the facts set out in paragraphs 21, 22 and 39 to 49, Al Masah Cayman was carrying on the Financial Service of Managing a Collective Investment Fund in or from the DIFC.
79. By reason of the conduct set out in paragraphs 34 to 38 above, Al Masah DIFC and Al Masah Cayman committed contraventions of Article 41B of the Regulatory Law.

*Contraventions by Al Masah DIFC of COB Rule 3.2.1 and GEN Rule 4.2.6*

80. COB Rule 3.2.1 provides that when communicating information to a person in relation to a Financial Product or Financial Service, an Authorised Firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that the communication is clear, fair and not misleading.
81. GEN Rule 4.2.6 (Principle 6) requires an Authorised Firm to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and to communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.

82. AI Masah DIFC contravened COB Rule 3.2.1 and GEN Rule 4.2.6 by reason of the facts set out at paragraphs 50 to 56 above.

*Contravention of Article 41B of the Regulatory Law*

83. By reason of the facts set out in paragraphs 57 and 58 above, Mr. Singhdeo engaged in conduct in connection with a Financial Service which was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, or was dishonest, thereby committing contraventions of Article 41B of the Regulatory Law. The conduct was in connection with the Financial Service of Arranging Deals in Investments or Managing a Collective Investment Fund carried on by AI Masah Cayman.

*Contravention of the Principles for Authorised Individuals*

84. In being knowingly concerned in the misleading or deceptive actions of AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman as set out at paragraphs 50 to 56 above, and in the creation of a falsified bank statement, as set out at paragraphs 57 and 58 above, the DFSA considers that Mr. Singhdeo failed to act with integrity and fair dealing in carrying out his Licensed Function at AI Masah DIFC. As a result, his conduct fell short of the standard reasonably to be expected of him as an Authorised Individual. The DFSA has therefore decided that Mr. Singhdeo contravened Principle 1 of the DFSA's Principles for Authorised Individuals in GEN Rule 4.4.1 (Principle 1 – Integrity). The DFSA has also decided that, by reason of that conduct, Mr. Singhdeo is not a fit and proper person to carry out any functions in connection with the provision of Financial Services in or from the DIFC.

**ACTION**

85. In the Relevant Period, Mr. Singhdeo was the SFO and a Licensed Director of AI Masah DIFC, the chief financial officer of AI Masah Cayman and the company secretary of both AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman. Mr. Singhdeo was knowingly concerned in each of the contraventions of legislation administered by the DFSA set out above.
86. In deciding whether to take the action specified in this Notice, the DFSA has taken into account the factors and considerations set out in paragraphs 4-10-2, 6-2-1 and 6-2-2 of the DFSA's Regulatory Policy and Process Sourcebook (**RPP**).
87. The DFSA considers the following factors to be of particular relevance in this matter:

- (1) the DFSA's objectives, in particular to prevent, detect and restrain conduct that causes or may cause damage to the reputation of the DIFC or the financial services industry in the DIFC, through appropriate means including the imposition of sanctions (Article 8(3)(d) of the Regulatory Law);
  - (2) the importance of ensuring that investors in funds marketed in or from the DIFC are not misled by those marketing such funds;
  - (3) the importance of deterring Authorised Firms from committing similar contraventions;
  - (4) the nature, seriousness and impact on investors of the contraventions;
  - (5) the position and responsibilities of Mr. Singhdeo as a Key Person (as defined in RPP 6-1-3(b)). The more senior the Key Person responsible for the misconduct, the more seriously the DFSA is likely to view the misconduct, and the more likely it is to take action against the Key Person.
88. The failure to disclose the Placement Fees payable in respect of any investment in shares in the Investment Companies from 2012 to 2016 in any Marketing Material, or the Subscription Forms, is only consistent with a deliberate policy that such information should not be disclosed to investors. Neither Al Masah DIFC nor Al Masah Cayman have produced any evidence that Placement Fees were disclosed to any investor.
89. Mr. Singhdeo was personally involved in steps taken to conceal information which might have disclosed the payment of Placement Fees from the Investment Companies to Al Masah Cayman as set out at 57 to 64 above.
90. The proper disclosure of information relating to Placement Fees was material to the decision of an investor as to whether to invest in the Investment Companies. The effect of the Placement Fee Agreements was that up to 10% of the amount of each investment would be paid out of the share capital of the Investment Company thus reducing the value of the equity invested.
91. The DFSA has considered the sanctions and other options available to it and has concluded the following actions are most appropriate in all the circumstances:
- (1) a prohibition from holding office in or being an employee of any Authorised Person, DNFBP, Reporting Entity or Domestic Fund, pursuant to Article 90(2)(g) of the Regulatory Law; and

(2) a fine of US\$150,000 pursuant to Article 90(2)(a) of the Regulatory Law.

As the DFSA has made a prohibition order, it does not consider it necessary pursuant to Article 59(1) of the Regulatory Law to impose a restriction on performing any function in connection with provision of Financial Services in or from the DIFC, notwithstanding its finding that Mr. Singhdeo is not a fit and proper person to perform such functions.

### **Prohibition**

92. Article 90(2)(g) of the Regulatory Law provides that the DFSA may impose a prohibition when a person has contravened legislation administered by the DFSA. from holding office in or being an employee of any Authorised Person, DNFBP, Reporting Entity or Domestic Fund in the DIFC.
93. Having regard to the facts and matters set out in this Notice, and in particular the findings that his conduct demonstrates a lack of integrity and that he is not a fit and proper person, the DFSA considers it appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances to impose such a prohibition on Mr. Singhdeo.
94. The DMC has also taken into consideration the deterrent effect that such action will have on others from engaging in similar misconduct and the DFSA's objectives in Article 8(3) of the Regulatory Law to:
- (1) foster and maintain confidence in the financial services industry in the DIFC (Article 8(3)(b) of the Regulatory Law);
  - (2) prevent, detect and restrain conduct that causes or may cause damage to the reputation of the DIFC or the financial services industry in the DIFC, through appropriate means including the imposition of sanctions (Article 8(3)(d) of the Regulatory Law); and
  - (3) to protect direct and indirect users and prospective users of the financial services industry in the DIFC (Article 8(3)(e) of the Regulatory Law).
95. In particular, in determining the seriousness of Mr. Singhdeo's conduct, the DFSA considers the following factors to be relevant:
- (1) the importance of ensuring that investors in funds marketed in or from the DIFC are not misled by those marketing such funds;
  - (2) the seriousness of the impact on investors; and

- (3) the implementation of a deliberate policy to avoid Placement Fees being disclosed to prospective investors.
96. The proper disclosure of information relating to Placement Fees was material to the decision of an investor as to whether to invest in the Investment Companies. The effect of the Placement Fee Agreements was that up to 10% of the amount of each investment would be paid out of the share capital of the Investment Company thus reducing the value of the equity invested.
97. The DFSA considers Mr. Singhdeo's contraventions and his knowing involvement in Al Masah DIFC's and Al Masah Cayman's contraventions to be serious for the following reasons:
- (1) the senior position held by Mr. Singhdeo within Al Masah DIFC;
  - (2) the detriment to investors in being deprived of information which was material to their investment decision;
  - (3) the non-disclosure of Placement Fees payable to Al Masah Cayman was a deliberate policy;
  - (4) over the period from 29 June 2011 to 23 March 2016 Al Masah Cayman received Placement Fees of approximately US\$29.8 million from the Investment Companies; and
  - (5) the falsification of the audited financial statements of ANEL and the alteration of a bank statement were particularly serious.
98. As set out at paragraph 84 above the DFSA considers that Mr. Singhdeo failed to act with integrity and fair dealing in carrying out his Licensed Functions at Al Masah DIFC. As a result, his conduct fell short of the standard reasonably to be expected of him as an Authorised Individual. The DFSA therefore considers that Mr. Singhdeo contravened Principle 1 of the DFSA's Principles for Authorised Individuals in GEN Rule 4.4.1 (Principle 1 – Integrity) and is not fit and proper to perform any functions in connection with the provision of Financial Services in or from the DIFC.
99. Accordingly, given the seriousness of the misconduct the DFSA considers it necessary and appropriate in the circumstances to impose the Prohibition on Mr. Singhdeo both to penalise him for his misconduct but also to protect users of the Financial Services industry in the DIFC should Mr. Singhdeo seek to hold office in or be an employee of

any Authorised Person, DNFBP, Reporting Entity or Domestic Fund in the DIFC in the future.

### **Determination of the Fine**

100. In determining the appropriate level of financial penalty to impose in this matter, the DFSA has taken into account the factors and considerations set out in Sections 6-4 and 6-5 of the RPP as follows.

#### *Step 1 – Disgorgement*

101. While the DFSA considers that the deliberate concealment from investors of the Placement Fees enabled such fees to be paid to AI Masah Cayman, the DFSA does not consider this step to be relevant in relation to Mr. Singhdeo.

#### *Step 2 – The seriousness of the contraventions*

102. The DFSA considers Mr. Singhdeo's contraventions and his knowing involvement in AI Masah DIFC's and AI Masah Cayman's contraventions to be serious for the reasons set out at paragraph 97 above.

103. Taking the above factors into account, the DFSA considers that a financial penalty of US\$100,000 appropriately reflects the seriousness of the contravention.

#### *Step 3 – Mitigating and aggravating factors*

104. In considering the appropriate level of the financial penalty, the DFSA had regard to the circumstances of this matter and the mitigating or aggravating factors set out in RPP 6-6-8.

105. The steps taken to conceal the payment of Placement Fees or their true amount in:

- (1) the 2013 and 2014 annual reports and falsified financial statements of ANEL;
- (2) the emails in which Mr. Singhdeo was involved referred to at paragraphs 36 to 38 above;
- (3) resisting the requirement of the auditors of ANEL that proper disclosure should be made of the material omissions in the 2013 and 2014 annual reports; and
- (4) the falsification of a bank statement,

were an attempt to cover up the failure to have made proper disclosure in the Marketing Material, and this is an aggravating factor.

106. Accordingly, the DFSA considers it appropriate to increase by 50% the figure after Step 2.

107. Therefore, the figure after Step 3 is US\$150,000.

#### *Step 4 – Adjustment for deterrence*

108. Pursuant to RPP 6-6-9, if the DFSA considers that the level of the financial penalty which it has arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the contravention, or others, from committing further or similar contraventions, then the DFSA may increase it. RPP 6-6-9 sets out the circumstances where the DFSA may do this.

109. The DFSA considers it important to demonstrate to Authorised Individuals and other natural persons knowingly concerned in breaches of legislation administered by the DFSA, that conduct involving deliberate non-disclosure of material information to investors, and steps subsequently taken to conceal from investors the fact that undisclosed fees had been received, will be treated seriously. However the DFSA considers that the figure arrived at after Step 3 is sufficient to meet its objective of credible deterrence, and should not be increased at Step 4.

#### *Step 5 – Settlement discount*

110. Where the DFSA and the person on whom the financial penalty is to be imposed agree on the amount and other terms, RPP 6-6-10 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which agreement is reached. There has been no settlement agreement and no discount is to be applied under Step 5.

#### **The level of the Fine imposed**

111. Given the factors and considerations set out in paragraphs 100 to 110 above and the circumstances of this matter, the DFSA has determined that it is proportionate and appropriate to impose on Mr. Singhdeo a fine of US\$150,000.

#### **EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE DECISION**

112. This decision takes effect on the date of this Notice and the Fine must be paid to the

DFSA no later than 60 days from the date of the Notice.

## **PROCEDURAL MATTERS**

### **Decision Making Committee**

113. The decision to which this Notice relates was made by Charles Flint QC, a non-executive director of the DFSA, acting as the Decision Making Committee of the DFSA.
114. This Notice is given to Mr. Singhdeo (hereafter “**you**” or “**your**”) under Paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 to the Regulatory Law.

### **Evidence and other material considered**

115. In accordance with Paragraphs 5(2) and 5(3) of Schedule 3 to the Regulatory Law, the DFSA has considered the following materials in making its decision:
- (1) the relevant materials provided with the Preliminary Notice;
  - (2) the written representations made on your behalf on 20 June 2019 and the materials provided with those representations;
  - (3) the Enforcement response dated 1 August 2019 to the representations referred to in (2) and the materials provided with that response; and
  - (4) the representations made on your behalf and Enforcement at the hearing on 16 and 17 September 2019 and the materials provided at the hearing.
116. Annex B sets out extracts from some statutory and regulatory provisions and guidance relevant to this Notice.

### **Representations**

117. In accordance with Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 3 to the Regulatory Law, you were given the opportunity to make representations to the DFSA in person and in writing concerning the DFSA’s decision.
118. Written representations on your behalf were submitted to the DFSA on 20 June 2019.
119. Enforcement was given an opportunity to comment on the written representations made on your behalf and provided a written response on 1 August 2019.

120. Representations were then made in person to the DFSA on your behalf and on Enforcement's behalf on 16 and 17 September 2019.
121. Annex A contains a summary of the main points made on your behalf in your representations and the DFSA's responses on those points. In making the decision the DFSA has taken into account all of the representations made on your behalf, whether or not set out in Annex A.

### **Referral to the Financial Markets Tribunal ("FMT")**

122. Under Articles 29 and 90(5) of the Regulatory Law, you have the right to refer the matter to the FMT for review. The FMT is operationally independent of the DFSA and has the power to conduct a full merits review of the matter.
123. Should you wish to have this matter reviewed by the FMT, you must exercise that right within 30 days of the date of this decision.
124. Proceedings before the FMT are commenced by submitting a Notice of Appeal (Form FMT 1) to the registrar of the FMT. The fee specified in section 4.2 of the Fees Module of the DFSA Rulebook must also be paid to the DFSA at the same time as the Notice of Appeal is filed with the registrar of the FMT.
125. The FMT Rules of Procedure, as well as the template of Form FMT 1 which includes the Registrar's contact details can be found on the DFSA's website at <https://www.dfsa.ae/en/About-Us/Our-Structure#Financial-Market-Tribunal>
126. Please note that under Paragraph 26 of the FMT Rules of Procedure, you must send a copy of Form FMT 1 to the DFSA on the same date it is filed with the Registrar of the FMT.

### **Publicity**

127. Under Article 116(2) of the Regulatory Law, the DFSA may publish, in such form and manner as it regards appropriate, information and statements relating to decisions of the DFSA and of the Court, censures, and any other matters which the DFSA considers relevant to the conduct of affairs in the DIFC.
128. RPP 5-17-2 is relevant to the publication of information about the matter to which this Notice relates. It provides that the DFSA will generally publish, in such form and manner as it regards appropriate, information and statements relating to enforcement actions.

129. RPP 5.17.9 to 5.17.11 are also relevant to when information will be published about a matter that may be referred to the FMT.

130. As the DFSA has decided to give you a Decision Notice, your representations may ultimately be made public in the event that this Decision Notice is published.

**DFSA contacts**

131. For more information concerning this matter generally, please contact the Administrator to the DMC on +971 4 362 1586 or by email at [DMC@dfsa.ae](mailto:DMC@dfsa.ae).

Signed:

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Charles Flint." The signature is written in a cursive style and is underlined with a single horizontal stroke.

.....

Charles Flint QC

On behalf of the Decision Making Committee of the DFSA

## ANNEX A

### REPRESENTATIONS

A summary of the main points made by the Respondents are in italics. The Decision Maker's responses on those points are set out under the italicised text.

Except as specified all references to a paragraph in a Preliminary Notice are to the Notice<sup>1</sup> addressed to Al Masah Cayman.

#### **Issue 1 – Did the arrangements constitute a Collective Investment Fund?**

##### **1.1 - Were the “Investment Companies” Funds?**

1. *The Respondents contend that the Investment Companies were not Collective Investment Funds (“Funds”) as defined in CIL for the reasons explained below.*
2. *First, the exclusion in CIR Rule 2.1.10 (Bodies corporate not undertaking investment management) applied to the Investment Companies. The purpose and effect of each of the Investment Companies was not investment management; it was to manage businesses for profit and capital gain. Further, there was no management of “Investments” or “Real Property” (as defined in the DFSA Rulebook) that would take them outside the scope of the exclusion. The property which was being managed was, for example, the underlying healthcare and educational facilities rather than Investments (such as a portfolio of shares). The fact that the businesses were conducted through underlying companies does not affect that analysis. Therefore, the arrangements fell within the scope of the exclusion.*
3. *Second, the arrangements do not meet the definition of a Fund in CIL as there is no property which can properly be regarded as being the subject of arrangements comprising a Fund. Investors subscribed for shares in the Investment Companies. Any arrangements related only to the Investors subscribing for shares in the Investment Companies and not to any other property. It makes no sense to say that those shares were pooled or managed as a whole and investors had no legal interest in the underlying assets of the Investment Companies.*
4. *Third, the condition in Article 11(1)(c)(i) of CIL is not satisfied. Even if investor contributions were pooled (which the Respondents do not admit), the profits from which payments were made to investors were not. Pooling refers to a commingling of previously separate interests, such as where profits generated by each investor’s separately owned property are paid into a general fund. When a company pays dividends to different investors from one company account, no pooling of separate interests has taken place: rather the company is simply using its funds to pay debts owed to each investor.*

1. Under Article 11 of CIL the relevant arrangements comprise not only legally binding arrangements but also any understanding shared between the parties to the transaction about how the scheme would operate (see *FCA v Asset Land* at para 91). In this case, the arrangements are contained in and clearly evidenced by the subscription form and the offer document referred to in the form. The parties to those arrangements are the investor, the Investment Company and Al Masah Cayman as manager of the Investment Company. The business plan of the Investment Company,

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<sup>1</sup> A reference to a paragraph in the Preliminary Notice may have changed in the Decision Notice.

as set out in the offer document, is that of a private equity fund acquiring assets with an exit strategy and has an investment purpose.

2. The relevant property comprised the Investment Company, its shareholding in the Operational Company and assets to be acquired by the Operational Company. The assets to be acquired consisted mainly of shares in unlisted companies which held the underlying businesses and assets. However in the case of ANEL the Investment Company also held substantial investment properties, as evidenced by the 2014 accounts (Ex 401) which disclose investment properties valued at US\$30 million, and investments in subsidiaries at US\$7.5 million. The incentive fee referred to in the subscription form was to be based on the returns generated on the investment in the Investment Company.
3. Article 11(1)(c) of CIL requires either pooling of contributions and profits, or management as a whole. Subject to the Fund Manager point (see below) it is not disputed that there was management as a whole. Under these arrangements income and profits were pooled in the accounts of the Investment Company so as to enable payments to be made to investors. The reference to “loss of control” in *FCA v Asset Land* at para 98 applies to the contributions made by Unitholders, not to the profits generated in the scheme by assets which are not under the control of any individual Unitholder. Article 11(1)(c)(i) does not require that the investor contributes both his contribution and the assets from which profits are to be paid. The profits are pooled in the accounts of the Investment Company and the Operational Company.
4. It is correct that under the arrangements, the profits or income were to be derived mainly from the underlying businesses and assets held by the subsidiaries, the shares in which were held by the Operational Company. The argument is that this was not investment management of Investments, that is Shares, but management of the underlying businesses and assets. This argument is rejected for the following reasons:
  - (i) The focus of CIR Rule 2.1.10 is on the purpose and effect of the relevant arrangements. As between the parties to those arrangements, that is the investor, the Investment Company and the manager, the purpose of the arrangements was to enable an investor to participate in a private equity fund holding shares in a portfolio of operational subsidiaries, with a number of potential exit routes including a strategic sale of the Operational Company, an IPO or a trade sale of shares to financial investors. The arrangements thus did comprise the investment management of Shares in the subsidiaries of the Operational Company. The active management and development of the underlying operational businesses to create value on exit is not inconsistent with a finding that the purpose of the manager and the investor is the investment management of Shares, with a view to a sale.
  - (ii) The investments held by the Operational Company, which was wholly owned by the Investment Company, were Shares in the operating subsidiaries, not the businesses and assets of those subsidiaries. It is not necessary for CIR Rule 2.1.10 to apply to show that that the Shares were held for the short term with a view to trading, or that investors took profits by the redemption of Units. In this case the purpose of the arrangements was to achieve a profitable exit for investors when the subsidiary companies could be sold at the best price.
  - (iii) The definition of a Private Equity Fund at CIR Rule 3.1.6 covers the relevant arrangements in this case, as the fund was to invest by means of Shares in unlisted companies. If the Respondents’ argument were correct it is difficult to see how any private equity fund in the form of a Body Corporate or Partnership

could meet the definition of a Fund, as all such funds would seek to manage an underlying operational business to add value with a view to a sale. Read together the clear intention of the relevant rules is that a private equity business is to be regarded as a Fund.

5. The DFSA has reasonable grounds for determining that the purpose and effect of these arrangements was the investment management of Investments comprising Shares in the subsidiaries of the Operational Company, and as noted at paragraph 2 above Real Property. The exclusion set out in CIR Rule 2.1.10 does not apply.

## **1.2 – Was Al Masah Cayman a “Fund Manager”?**

1. *The Respondents do not admit that a Foreign Fund can have a Fund Manager as defined in Art 20(2) of CIL, but submit that in any event Al Masah Cayman could not have been a Fund Manager in respect of the Investment Companies or any relevant property. This is because one element of the Fund Manager definition under Article 20 of CIL requires the person to be legally accountable to the Unitholders in the Fund for the management of the Fund, including the property held for or within the Fund. Al Masah Cayman was not legally accountable to the investors for the management of those companies or any relevant property. The test of legal accountability in this Article requires a clear legal duty rather than a speculative or hypothetical duty.*
2. *Al Masah Cayman’s appointment as proxy under the terms of the Subscription Forms gave it no right to manage either the Investment Companies or the underlying property which is alleged to be the subject of arrangements comprising a Fund. The contractual duties Al Masah Cayman owed to the Investment Companies under the Management Agreements were not owed to investors and the Subscription Forms did not impose on it any managerial functions, or any accountability to investors. Al Masah Cayman therefore cannot be said to have been legally responsible to investors for the management of relevant property.*
1. It is clear that Al Masah Cayman did manage the Investment Companies, but the point taken is whether Al Masah Cayman was legally accountable to Unitholders so as to fall within the definition of Fund Manager at Article 20(4) of CIL.
2. The definition of “Fund Manager” is dealt with in more detail under Issue 2. The purpose of the provision for legal accountability in Article 20(2) of CIL and GEN Rule 2.12.1 is to identify the person who is to be regarded as the Fund Manager. The words “legally accountable” are wide in scope, and do not require that the function of management be contained in a contract between each Unitholder and the putative manager. A person who establishes or winds up a fund is unlikely to have a contract with Unitholders, yet he may be treated as the Fund Manager as contemplated by GEN Rule 2.12.1.
3. Under the relevant arrangements the investor did enter into a contract with Al Masah Cayman under which it accepted the responsibility of acting as manager of the Investment Company and in consideration of so acting was entitled to an annual management fee from the Investment Company and an incentive fee from the investor. In order to ensure that it had control and management of the Investment Company, Al Masah Cayman was granted a proxy by the investor for company meetings; a power which gave rise to a duty to exercise it for proper purposes. Al Masah Cayman was thus legally accountable to investors for management of the Investment Company. However, for the reasons given above this point is not material as the arrangements fell within Article 11(1)(c) in any event on the basis that

contributions and profits or income were pooled.

## **Issue 2 - If the Investment Companies were Funds, did Al Masah Cayman Offer Fund Units contrary to Article 50 of CIL?**

*The Respondents submit that it is inconsistent for the DFSA to argue that Al Masah Cayman contravened Article 50(1)(b) of CIL by offering Units to prospective investors in circumstances where it was not a Fund Manager, when the DFSA alleges elsewhere in the Notice that Al Masah Cayman was the Fund Manager of the Investment Companies. If the DFSA is to contend that CIL should be interpreted as using the term Fund Manager in different senses in different provisions, it should both justify that interpretation and recognise that the regime is unclear.*

1. Paragraph 15 of the representations raises the point whether the words “Fund Manager” in Articles 11 and 50 (1) of CIL can have the same meaning when the first provision is alleged to apply to Al Masah Cayman and the second is not.
2. The issue arises from the general definition of Fund Manager given at Schedule 1 and Article 20(4) of CIL. Schedule 1 expressly provides that definitions apply unless the context indicates otherwise.
3. Article 20 of CIL restricts the management of Domestic Funds; it does not deal with Foreign Funds which are the subject of this case. Article 20(4) does not purport to provide an exhaustive definition of the term; the Article provides that Fund Manager includes an Authorised Firm which manages a Domestic Fund and an External Fund Manager. Nor does Article 20(4) cross refer to Article 20(2) to provide that legal accountability to unitholders is necessary for the definition to apply.
4. On a proper construction of Article 11(1)(c) of CIL, the reference to the Fund Manager must include an unauthorised person acting in that role, whether or not that person has legal accountability to Unitholders. Otherwise, in the case of funds where contributions and profits are not pooled, the provision for management as a whole could be circumvented in every case by an unauthorised Fund Manager, so that the arrangements would not fall within the scope of Article 11.
5. On the other hand the marketing prohibition at Article 50 of CIL is to be read differently. The exclusion at (b) applies to the Fund Manager or an Authorised Firm whose Licence authorises the activity. In that different context, the intention is clear that the Fund Manager will be authorised; otherwise the provision would be internally inconsistent. The purpose of the provision is that there should be compliance with the prospectus requirements, the offer should be made in accordance with the law and Rules, and be made by an Authorised Firm. That interpretation would also be consistent with Article 54 which proceeds on the basis that only an Authorised Firm may market Foreign Funds.
6. For those reasons Al Masah Cayman, as an unauthorised Fund Manager, did contravene the prohibition on marketing of Funds in Article 50 of CIL.

### **Issue 3 - Was AI Masah Cayman Arranging Deals in Investments?**

*The Respondents contend that AI Masah Cayman was not Arranging Deals in Investments, as it was a party to the relevant transactions and hence fell within the exclusion in GEN Rule 2.9.2. The relevant transactions in this context are the investors' subscriptions for shares in the Investment Companies. AI Masah Cayman was a party to these transactions as it signed the Subscription Forms, was appointed to act as proxy by each investor and each investor undertook certain obligations to AI Masah Cayman e.g. to pay an incentive fee and keep it indemnified.*

1. There is no dispute that AI Masah Cayman made arrangements with a view to the investor buying or subscribing for Shares in the Investment Company, and thus, subject to any exclusion, made arrangements falling within GEN Rule 2.9.1. The deal in Investments which was arranged was the purchase by the investor of Shares in the Investment Company.
2. The exclusion at GEN Rule 2.9.2 applies if AI Masah Cayman is to be regarded as a party to the transaction. Read together with GEN Rule 2.9.1, the transaction referred to must mean the investment deal between the investor and the Investment Company, not any collateral agreement between the investor and the arranger relating to the terms on which the arranger offered its services to the investor.
3. AI Masah was a party to the subscription agreement but that agreement comprised both the transaction under which the Investment Company agreed to issue shares to the investor, and the terms on which AI Masah Cayman, as arranger, had agreed to introduce the investor to the transaction. AI Masah was not the party liable to perform the obligation to allot shares, and thus was not a party to that transaction, so that the exclusion at GEN Rule 2.9.2 does not apply.

### **Issue 4 - Did AI Masah Cayman make Financial Promotions?**

1. *The Respondents submit that AI Masah Cayman did not make financial promotions in or from the DIFC in breach of the Financial Promotions Prohibition in Article 41A of the Regulatory Law as:*
  - i. *all marketing activities in the DIFC were carried out by AI Masah DIFC pursuant to its Licence, or by Kotak Mahindra Financial Services Ltd ("Kotak"); and*
  - ii. *those marketing activities in the DIFC are not attributable to AI Masah Cayman because neither AI Masah DIFC nor Kotak were acting as AI Masah Cayman's agent.*
2. *The Respondents say there is no basis under the law for concluding that an agency relationship existed between AI Masah Cayman and either AI Masah DIFC or Kotak, as:*
  - (a) *the basis on which AI Masah DIFC and Kotak marketed shares in the Investment Companies for AI Masah Cayman was governed and evidenced by the contractual arrangements between them. Those arrangements did not exhibit characteristics essential to an agency relationship, such as: (i) the agent representing or being identified with the principal; (ii) the agent having the ability to affect legal relations between the principal and third parties; and (iii) the agent owing fiduciary duties to the principal;*

- (b) *neither AI Masah DIFC nor Kotak were authorised to enter into contracts on behalf of AI Masah Cayman without its approval. That is a significant factor indicating that no relationship of agency existed; and*
  - (c) *AI Masah DIFC was a subsidiary of AI Masah Cayman. It will not lightly be inferred that a subsidiary company is the agent of its parent, as to do so defeats the purpose of a corporate structure which creates separate legal entities.*
3. *The Respondents also argue that it is not sufficient for the DFSA to state in the Preliminary Notices that, when dealing with Investors and communicating Marketing Material, directors and employees' acts and omissions can be attributed to both AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC. There needs to be some logical basis for attributing the acts or omissions to one entity or the other.*
1. The issue concerns the rules of attribution, which is a question of construction of the relevant laws and Rules, against the factual background. It is not necessary to establish that in making financial promotions AI Masah DIFC was acting as agent for AI Masah Cayman. The issue as to which company or companies made the Financial Promotions in or from the DIFC depends on the substance, not the form, of the activity (see *Khorafi v Sarasin* CA 2016 at para 331).
  2. Many of the promotions expressly stated that "This document is being distributed by (AI Masah DIFC) on behalf of (AI Masah Cayman)", which is described as the investment manager and placement agent. The investment being promoted was an investment in a private equity fund managed by AI Masah Cayman, on the terms set out in the Subscription Form and term sheet in the offer document. The investors entered into a contract with AI Masah Cayman and were generally treated as clients of that company, not AI Masah DIFC. It is accepted that marketing material was made available on the AI Masah Cayman website. The employees engaged in promotional activities from the offices of the AI Masah Group in the DIFC, were employees of AI Masah Cayman. Under the Management Agreements with the Investment Companies, AI Masah Cayman was responsible for capital raising, and that function had not been sub-contracted to AI Masah DIFC.
  3. On the evidence AI Masah Cayman did make Financial Promotions in or from the DIFC in contravention of Article 41A of the Regulatory Law.

**Issue 5 - If AI Masah Cayman did make Financial Promotions, were they Exempt Financial Promotions?**

1. *The Respondents submit that even if AI Masah Cayman made Financial Promotions, it did not contravene Article 41A(1) of the Regulatory Law as any Financial Promotions were exempt Financial Promotions by virtue of GEN Rule 3.4.1. This is because there is clear evidence, which the DFSA has disregarded, that all Financial Promotions were in fact approved by AI Masah DIFC. The fact that Financial Promotions did not contain an express statement that they had been approved, is neither evidence nor proof that such approval was not given.*
2. *The Respondents further submit that the Subscription Forms are not Financial Promotions as defined in Article 41A of the Regulatory Law, as they do not invite or induce a Person to do either of the things referred to in sub-sections (3)(a) or (b) of that Article. They are the very agreements at which any Financial Promotions were*

*directed and a contractual document cannot be said to be promoting itself. The Subscription Forms did not, therefore, require AI Masah DIFC's approval. In addition, the sending of annual reports to existing investors does not of itself constitute a Financial Promotion and so no approval of the annual reports was necessary.*

1. Under GEN Rule 3.6.1 AI Masah DIFC was required not to approve a Financial Promotion unless it included a clear and prominent statement that it had been so approved. The absence of such a statement from much of the Marketing Material raises an inference that such material was not so approved.
2. The very general evidence that financial promotions were checked by compliance does not establish that they were approved by AI Masah DIFC. Annex D provides evidence as to which promotions were approved, based on internal evidence provided by AI Masah DIFC, but that extends only to a minority of the promotions.
3. A subscription form sent to a prospective investor invites or induces the recipient to enter into the agreement proposed by signing the form, and thus constitutes a financial promotion falling within the definition at Article 41A Regulatory Law. The annual reports of ANEL were financial promotions if sent to prospective investors to induce the investor to enter into an agreement to acquire units in the funds promoted by AI Masah Cayman.

## **Issue 6 - Were misrepresentations made in communications to investors?**

### **6.1 Fees representation**

1. *The Respondents do not accept that a false implied representation was made to the effect that, other than annual management fees, no fees arising from the capital subscription made by the investor would be paid to AI Masah Cayman by the relevant Investment Company. They contend that, based on the following analysis, no such representation was implied.*
2. *Whether a representation is to be implied from words or conduct is a question of law. The test is objective: what a reasonable person, having the characteristics and knowledge the investors appeared to the Respondents to have, would have understood from the words used in the context in which they were used. In this case the investors were of three kinds: (i) institutions such as banks and government entities; (ii) companies and trusts and investment vehicles; and (iii) high net worth individuals. Such prospective investors can be taken to be sophisticated and to be able to evaluate, or to have access to expert advice which enables them to understand, three things which prevent an implied representation arising:*
  - i. *the Investment Companies could lawfully pay brokerage under Cayman Islands law;*
  - ii. *the Investment Companies were expressly permitted to pay brokerage under their Articles of Association; and*
  - iii. *it was common market practice to pay brokerage, and in particular for brokerage to be paid to the placement agent.*
3. *The Subscription Forms are contractual documents and must be interpreted as such. The language they contain regarding the annual management fee is not a*

*representation at all, but an acknowledgement by the investor that such a fee is payable to Al Masah Cayman; intended to contractually estop the investor from claiming otherwise. There is no representation made by anyone in these documents regarding the management fees, let alone an implied representation that no other fees would be paid.*

4. *All of the investor presentations and teasers listed in Annex C to the Notice refer to the appointment of Al Masah Cayman as “Placement Agent”. This is a standard role in private equity that carries with it an entitlement to compensation. A reasonable investor would know this. Further, these documents contain a disclaimer in the “Notifications” section about reliance on the information presented. That disclaimer prevents an investor from reasonably inferring he was being presented with unqualified or complete information. Finally, the pages in the investor presentations which refer to management or incentive fees are clearly intended to be a summary and do not purport to contain all potentially relevant or material information.*
1. The contraventions alleged to arise under Articles 56(1) & (2) of CIL and Article 41B of the Regulatory Law focus on the statements made in communications to prospective investors. The issue is whether in fact and in their context the communications disclosing some fees payable to the manager, but omitting disclosure of the Placement Fees, was likely to mislead or deceive investors generally or some classes of investor.
2. It is accepted in the Respondents’ representations at paragraphs 123 and 147.2.6 that it was a deliberate policy adopted by Al Masah Cayman not to disclose the amount of the Placement Fees in order to retain a competitive edge in the market. As the non-disclosure was intentional it is difficult to see how, as is suggested in the representations, investors should be taken to know that there were in fact undisclosed Placement Fees.
3. Conduct which is misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, or which omits from a document information necessary to make a statement not misleading or deceptive, may arise in cases where there is a misrepresentation which would not be actionable in law. The case law cited at paragraphs 77 to 81 and 83 to 88 of the Respondents’ submissions would be relevant as to whether there was an actionable misrepresentation, but is not relevant to the misconduct alleged.
4. A person cannot by disclaimer or contract avoid or limit these regulatory provisions (see COB Rule 3.2.2). The disclaimers or notifications referred to at paragraphs 75, 78, 81 and 91 do not affect the import of the statements made in the Marketing Material. None of those notifications give any indication to investors of undisclosed fees, still less of their amount.
5. That certain classes of investor might, as a matter of contract, be taken to know that under Cayman Islands law or the Articles, the Investment Company was permitted to pay brokerage does not meet the case. On the evidence referred to in the Enforcement response at paragraphs 143 to 149 there were a number of investors who could not properly be treated as sophisticated investors, but in any event the relevant provisions apply to retail and professional clients.
6. In the offer documents a clear statement was made as to the fees to be paid to Al Masah Cayman as manager from the investment Company’s capital. It was misleading or deceptive by omission not to disclose that the manager would also receive a fee of up to 10% of the investor’s subscription.

## 6.2 Accounts representation

*The Respondents admit that a representation was made in the 2013 and 2014 ANEL Annual Reports that the financial statements they contained were the audited and approved financial statements (the “Accounts Representation”), and that such representation was untrue. However, they contend that this representation was not made to prospective investors, other than possibly to Investor C via an intermediary. Rather, the Annual Reports were shared with: (i) referral agents as a corporate presentation so that they could understand the business; (ii) strategic partners such as Investor A; and (iii) members of the placement team in Singapore for investors in that market, which operated in a completely different regulatory regime. There is no evidence that these Annual Reports were given to prospective investors.*

1. It is admitted that an untrue representation was made that the financial statements complied with applicable accounting standards, had been approved by the directors and were subject to an auditor’s report. The representations do not address the more serious allegation at paragraph 53 of the Preliminary Notice that the annual reports and financial statements were misleading, deceptive and not fair to investors in deliberately concealing the Placement Fees paid to Al Masah Cayman. Nor do the representations seek to offer any explanation as to why falsified financial statements should have been prepared or shared with referral agents and others.
2. The denial that falsified annual statements were sent to prospective investors, save for Investor C, is contrary to the evidence referred to at paragraph 122 of the Enforcement response.

## 6.3 Investor A representation

*The Respondents deny that a misrepresentation was made to Investor A that Al Masah Cayman’s fees pertaining to the private equity platform consisted only of a specified sum in management fees. Rather, fees which could have been described in one way, for example, as placement fees were described in another equally legitimate way. This was in the context of a negotiation between sophisticated parties, who are well aware that fees could be described in different ways and could seek further particulars if they wish. In any case, Investor A was not a prospective investor, but a government entity in discussions with Al Masah Cayman about setting up a fund.*

The misrepresentation alleged at paragraph 37 of the Preliminary Notice is very clear, and relates to the quantum of fee income on the private equity platform, not just as to the description of that fee income. The table of income totalling US14.34 million had been altered so as to reduce placement fee income from the true figure US9.98 million to US2.2 million, which lower figure was falsely represented not to relate to the private equity platform. This was a deliberate misrepresentation calculated to conceal the fact that Al Masah Cayman received substantial placement fees from private equity investors. The misrepresentation was made in the context of discussions with investor A about investment in the Investment Companies.

## Issue 7 - Were communications to investors unclear, unfair or misleading?

*The Respondents argue that, contrary to the DFSA’s allegations, the existence of the Placement Fees was disclosed to prospective investors through a combination of the*

*Investment Companies' Articles of Association and the Marketing Material. The Respondents argue that the non-disclosure of the level of the Placement Fees cannot make the communications unclear, unfair or misleading as:*

- i. the obligations arising under COB and GEN cannot impose a duty of disclosure more onerous than that applicable to a fiduciary. Under relevant case law, even a fiduciary would not have been obliged to disclose the level of commission. It is not realistic in this situation to impose such a duty when it is obvious that the parties have contrary interests: the placement agent is trying to extract money from investors;*
  - ii. the level of the Placement Fee was not material to the decision-making of prospective investors, based on the evidence of investors;*
  - iii. the relevant investors were sophisticated and therefore could be assumed to know that, for this type of investment, a Placement Fee is normally deducted up front from the amount invested; and*
  - iv. assessing fairness requires the interests of both parties to be considered. The level of Placement Fees was highly sensitive and confidential. As such, there were legitimate business reasons not to disclose the level of Placement Fees and so it was not unfair to withhold that information.*
1. The issue is whether Al Masah DIFC contravened COB Rule 3.2.1 and GEN Rule 4.2.6, as alleged at paragraphs 61 – 64 of the Preliminary Notice issued to Al Masah DIFC.
  2. Under Issue 6 it has been determined that the relevant misrepresentations constituted conduct which was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. It follows from that finding that there were also breaches of COB Rule 3.2.1 and GEN Rule 4.2.6.
  3. The words “clear, fair and not misleading” are to be applied in their normal sense to the relevant information communicated. Principle 6 is a fundamental aspect of the regulatory system, reflecting the duty to customers. The duty of a fiduciary at common law or in equity is not an exact analogy, and the case law cited by the Respondents at paragraphs 107 – 113 cannot be deployed to limit the duty imposed by the Rules.
  4. The statement at paragraph 47 of the Preliminary Notice issued to Al Masah DIFC that placement fees of 10% of capital subscribed were more material than the annual management fees disclosed is not essential to the case under COB Rule 3.2.1 and GEN Rule 4.2.6, but if correct would reinforce that case. It is a reasonable inference that most or at least some investors would have regarded an up front charge of 10% on the investor's capital subscribed as being more significant than an annual management fee of 2% to be paid by the Investment Company. The evidence cited by the Respondents (at paragraphs 115 to 121) when considered in its full context (at paragraphs 143 – 149 of the Enforcement response) does not invalidate that inference from the evidence. The evidence cited at paras 150 – 151 of the Enforcement response strongly supports the inference.
  5. Paras 122 – 123 of the Respondents' representations asserts that there were legitimate reasons for not disclosing the level of Placement Fees, thus reaffirming that the non disclosure was deliberate and motivated by a commercial desire to preserve the competitive edge of Al Masah Cayman. That consideration cannot properly excuse communications which were misleading and not fair.

**Issue 8 - Were AI Masah DIFC or AI Masah Cayman negligent in relation to any misrepresentations or communications which were unclear, unfair or misleading?**

*The Respondents admit that the Accounts Representation was negligent. Otherwise, if the Respondents are wrong in their submission that no other misrepresentations or unclear, unfair or misleading communications were made, they deny that any such misrepresentations or communications were made negligently by the corporate Respondents. The Respondents argue that all reasonable steps were taken to ensure that Marketing Material complied with the regulatory regime. Specifically:*

- (a) reliance was placed on a Compliance Officer, who was responsible for ensuring that marketing was undertaken in compliance with relevant legal requirements;*
- (b) all Marketing Material was sent to the Compliance Officer for checking to ensure it was not misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive; and*
- (c) reliance was also placed on external legal advice from the law firm Walkers, who were responsible for drafting and checking various documents. It was on the advice of Walkers that the Placement Fees were not explicitly set out in the Marketing Material.*

1. Negligence is not the issue in relation to the contraventions alleged against AI Masah Cayman under Article 56 of CIL and Article 41B of the Regulatory Law, or against AI Masah DIFC under those provisions and GEN Rule 4.2.6. In each case the allegation is clear that the communications to prospective investors were objectively misleading.
2. COB Rule 3.2.1 requires proof that the firm did not take reasonable steps to ensure that the communications were clear, fair and not misleading. The allegation is that the communications reflected a deliberate policy to conceal Placement Fees. That this was a deliberate policy appears to be accepted in the representations made under Issue 7, referred to above.
3. In any event, AI Masah DIFC did not take any reasonable steps to meet the requirements of COB Rule 3.2.1. The assertion that the Compliance Officer was aware of the Placement Fees and reviewed the Marketing Material with that knowledge is inconsistent with her evidence that she did not know about the Placement Fees. The assertion that AI Masah's solicitors in Cayman advised that Placement Fees did not need to be disclosed is a misstatement of the effect of the email relied upon.

**Issue 9 - Were the individual respondents knowingly concerned in contraventions by the bodies corporate?**

1. *The Respondents submit that to be knowingly involved in a misrepresentation, a person must at least have the dishonest state of mind required to establish a deceit claim. The Respondents contend that, even if the misrepresentations alleged were made, the DFSA has not given particulars either of the required dishonest state of mind of the individual Respondents, or the evidence from which the DFSA infers that state of mind.*
2. *Similarly, in relation to the allegation that the individual Respondents were knowingly*

*concerned in communications which were unclear or unfair, the Respondents contend that the DFSA must give proper particulars to establish that those individuals knew that communications were unclear or unfair and has failed to do so.*

3. *Aside from the Accounts Representation, the Respondents' position is that none of the individual Respondents were knowingly concerned in a misrepresentation or an unclear or unfair statement being made, for the following reasons:*
  - (a) *each of Mr Dash, Mr Singhdeo and Mr Lim placed reasonable reliance on the internal and external professionals responsible for the Marketing Material to ensure that they complied with relevant laws; and*
  - (b) *in relation to the email chain with Investor A on which the DFSA relies, there is nothing in that email chain which is inconsistent with an honest attempt, on the part of all three individual Respondents, to describe fee income in a legitimate way.*
4. *As regards the Accounts Representation, the Respondents contend that none of the Individual Respondents were aware at the relevant time that the 2013 and 2014 ANEL Annual Reports contained a misrepresentation, because:*
  - (a) *Mr Dash and Mr Singhdeo were not aware of the Accounts Representation until November 2015;*
  - (b) *Mr Dash was not involved in preparing the 2013 and 2014 ANEL Annual Reports, nor was he involved in implementing the Board of ANEL's decision not to refer to Placement Fees in those reports;*
  - (c) *Mr Singhdeo did not check to ensure that the decision taken by the Board of ANEL not to disclose the Placement Fees in those reports was properly implemented; and*
  - (d) *Mr Lim did not appreciate that the false Accounts Representation was being made in the 2013 and 2014 ANEL Annual Reports; he is not an accountant and relied on others to ensure that the financial statements were presented and characterised properly.*
5. *As regards the allegations that AI Masah Cayman was carrying on Financial Services and making Financial Promotions without the required authorisation, the Respondents submit that even if those allegations are true, there is no evidence that Mr Dash was knowingly concerned in it doing so.*

1. "Knowingly concerned" is defined at Article 86(7) of the Regulatory Law. The relevant aspects of the Article are aiding and abetting a contravention, or being knowingly involved in the contravention. As defined, the term has the same effect as used in section 382 FSMA. Applying *FCA v Capital Alternatives* [2018] 3 WLUK 623 at paragraphs 799 – 802, it is necessary to establish both actual knowledge of the facts which constitute a contravention and actual involvement in the contravention. It is not necessary to prove knowledge that the conduct did amount to a contravention, nor dishonesty.
2. It is indisputable that Mr Dash as CEO of AI Masah Cayman knew that the company was not authorised to carry on any regulated activities in or from the DIFC. Reliance on the assertion that the Compliance Officer had reviewed the Marketing Material does

not provide any answer to the case that Mr Dash was knowingly concerned in misleading or deceptive statements made in the marketing material. Mr Dash does not dispute that it was a deliberate policy not to disclose placement fees to prospective investors, and it is accepted that members of the Board made the decision that Placement Fees should not be disclosed in financial statements.

3. It is not necessary that each of the relevant dissemination of documents should be analysed in detail, but it is important to determine whether there is documentary evidence which establishes that Mr Dash had knowledge of the communication of false and deceptive information, and involvement in that communication. The evidence directly supports the allegation that Mr Dash was knowingly concerned in the following misleading or deceptive communications referred to in the Preliminary Notice addressed to him:

Para 59 (1) – Investor A – in the email sent on 9 September 2014 Mr Dash gave an instruction that the table disclosing placement fee income of US9.9 million should not be sent, having made a suggestion that placement fee income could be reduced to 3% in the information disclosed; the emails at Ex 723a and 728 showing how the placement fee income had been reduced to US2.2 million were copied to Mr Dash, and are inconsistent with the assertion that this was an honest attempt to describe fees in a legitimate way.

Para 59 (2) – ANEL financial statements and annual reports 2013 and 2014 – the facts asserted are supported by the documentary evidence. Paragraph 147.2.6 of the Respondents' representations states that the Board decided that placement fee income should not be disclosed in the annual reports. In that context the email exchange on 24 November 2014 evidences that Mr Dash understood the significance of sending annual reports, rather than signed audited statements, and contradicts his evidence that he was not aware of the falsity of the annual reports until November 2015. It is also relevant to note that on 9 September 2014 (see Ex 769) Mr Dash had given the instruction that a document showing the amount of placement fee income should not be disclosed to Investor A;

Para 59 (3) – Distributor B – the email exchange on 24 November 2014 evidences this allegation.

4. The argument for Mr Singhdeo is that he was not aware until November 2015 that the financial statements in the ANEL Annual Returns contained financial statements which had been altered. However the evidence is that Mr Singhdeo had been involved from April 2014 in seeking to persuade the auditors not to require explicit disclosure of placement fees so he was well aware of the commercial need to avoid disclosure to investors. In about April 2014 he signed both the audited 2013 financial statements and the misleading version of those statements. It was the misleading version which Mr. Singhdeo sent to Investor C in March 2015. In September 2014 he was knowingly concerned in the misleading information sent to Investor A. In about May 2015 he signed both the audited 2014 financial statements and the misleading version of those statements.
5. Mr Lim attended the audit committee of ANEL and signed the audited financial statements for 2013 and 2014, and the misleading version of the 2014 statements. The email he sent on 24 November 2014 shows clear awareness that he was not sending the audited financial statements to investors. He was involved in the emails relating to the misleading table of income sent to Investor A and the annual reports of ANEL for 2013 and 2014 sent to Distributor B and others. The evidence establishes that he was

aware of the falsity of the representations being made.

### **Issue 10 - Did Mr Singhdeo or Mr Lim breach Article 41 of the Regulatory Law in relation to the alteration of bank statements?**

1. *The Respondents argue that, as Al Masah Cayman was neither Managing a Collective Investment Fund nor Arranging Deals in Investments, there can be no contravention of Article 41B of the Regulatory Law as the alleged alteration was not in connection with a Financial Service as required under that Article. Even if that position is not accepted, Mr Singhdeo and Mr Lim deny that they were involved in the alteration of a bank statement and, for the following reasons, the Respondents submit that the DFSA has failed to establish such a serious allegation.*
2. *First, there is no cogent evidence that the individuals instructed Mr Agarwalla to alter a bank statement. Even Mr Agarwalla's evidence does not support the allegation made that he was instructed by Mr Singhdeo to alter a bank statement. In any case, Mr Agarwalla was a disgruntled employee and his evidence is not satisfactory.*
3. *Second, the DFSA has been unable to articulate any reason why Mr Singhdeo or Mr Lim would wish to alter a bank statement.*
4. *Third, the DFSA's suggestion that there was an intention to provide an altered bank statement to the auditors is speculation and not supported by any evidence; there is no explanation as to what it would have achieved and no evidence such a statement was in fact provided to the auditors.*

1. Under issues 1 and 3 the contention that Al Masah Cayman was neither Managing Collective Investment funds nor Arranging Deals in Investments has been rejected. On that basis the general prohibition against misconduct in Article 41B of the Regulatory Law applies to the conduct of Mr Singhdeo and Mr Lim. However, if the relevant Investment were regarded not as a Unit but a Share, Article 41B would still apply as the conduct was in relation to the Financial Service of Arranging Deals in Investments. Conduct designed to cover up the fact that misrepresentations had been made to investors in the Subscription Form and offer document would relate to that Financial Service.
2. The documentary evidence clearly demonstrates that copy bank statements were falsified so as to delete and alter entries, and that each of Mr Singhdeo and Mr Lim participated in that conduct which was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, or was dishonest. On the balance of probabilities, the motive for preparing a false version of the bank statement was as alleged, as the relevant documents were found in an audit file. Whatever the motive, the Respondents have been unable to put forward any legitimate explanation for the conduct.

### **Issue 11 - Did any of the individuals act without integrity?**

#### Mr Dash

1. *For the reasons already set out, the Respondents contend that Mr Dash was not knowingly involved in the alleged contraventions of the corporate Respondents. Accordingly there is no basis on which the DFSA could conclude that he failed to act*

*with integrity.*

2. *Also, it would be wrong to suggest that merely because he was a more senior individual in the organisation that any contraventions were more serious than those of other individuals.*

### Mr Singhdeo and Mr Lim

3. *Again, for the reasons already set out, the Respondents contend that Mr Singhdeo and Mr Lim did not alter a bank statement and were not knowingly involved in any alleged contraventions by the corporate Respondents, so there is no basis on which the DFSA could conclude that they failed to act with integrity.*

As the representations accept, the issue of integrity follows from the findings on Issues 9 and 10 above.

### **Issue 12 - What if any action should be taken against AI Masah Cayman or AI Masah DIFC?**

*If contrary to the Respondents' case, the DFSA finds there has been any contravention by the corporate Respondents, it is argued that the DFSA should give adequate weight to the following factors in deciding what (if any) penalty to impose:*

- i. neither of the corporate Respondents has previously been disciplined by the DFSA;*
  - ii. the DFSA has been fully aware of the corporate Respondents' business model for many years, for example through the submission of regulatory business plans, and has not raised any concerns with it;*
  - iii. the DFSA's case has changed significantly in the course of its investigation, which demonstrates that any violations were far from obvious and as such were excusable;*
  - iv. the Corporate Respondents have reasonably relied on in-house and external expertise in order to ensure compliance; and*
  - v. the Corporate Respondents have fully co-operated with the DFSA's investigation.*
1. The basis of the 2010 and 2013 Regulatory Plans was that AI Masah DIFC was to act "as investment manager for the investment funds to be launched by (AI Masah Cayman)". There was no disclosure that AI Masah Cayman proposed to carry out any regulated activities in or from the DIFC or itself act as the Fund Manager of the Funds. The charging structure did not disclose placement fees. AI Masah DIFC had been granted a licence to Manage Collective Investment Funds. Those statements gave a misleading picture of the business model of AI Masah Cayman and its Funds. There is no evidence that the various contractual arrangements between AI Masah DIFC and AI Masah Cayman were disclosed to the DFSA.
  2. The risk assessments carried out by the DFSA were based on the description of the activities set out in the Regulatory Plans.
  3. It is not accepted that the factors summarised at paragraph 179 of the representations

give rise to any substantial mitigation. It is accepted that that the DFSA has not previously disciplined AI Masah DIFC or AI Masah Cayman, but it is not accepted, for the reasons above, that the DFSA was fully aware of the business model of AI Masah Cayman and AI Masah DIFC.

4. As set out above it is not accepted that the contraventions proved, as set out in the Decision Notice, were either excusable or not clear, nor was reliance on in-house and external expertise the cause of any of those violations, which arose from decisions made by senior management. It is accepted that the Respondents have cooperated with the DFSA investigation and have responded to concerns raised by the DFSA since the commencement of the investigation.

### **Issue 13 - What if any action should be taken against individual respondents?**

1. *Again, the Respondents do not accept that there have been contraventions by the individual Respondents. However if the DFSA finds there have been contraventions by those individuals, it argues many of the points to be given adequate weight in determining what (if any) penalty to impose upon the corporate Respondents are also relevant to the individuals. For example, the DFSA being aware of and not raising concerns about the business model, the DFSA's case changing significantly and reliance being reasonably placed on both in-house and external expertise in order to ensure compliance.*
2. *In addition, the DFSA should recognise that it has received full cooperation from the individual Respondents and that none of them has a poor disciplinary record. On the contrary, they have worked with diligence and integrity to achieve professional success.*

The points set out under Issue 13 have been considered above. The fact that the individuals have no disciplinary record and have cooperated with the investigation is acknowledged, but those factors do not mitigate the seriousness of the contraventions. The DFSA considers that the action taken is justified.

## ANNEX B – RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

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This annex sets out the text of relevant legislation and regulatory provisions in force during the Relevant Period.

### **1. RELEVANT LEGISLATION**

#### **Regulatory Law - DIFC Law No. 1 of 2004 (Regulatory Law 2004)**

Article 8(3) of the Regulatory Law 2004 sets out the DFSA's objectives.

#### **8. *The Powers, Functions and Objectives of the DFSA***

(...)

(3) *In performing its functions and exercising its powers, the DFSA shall pursue the following objectives:*

(...)

(b) *to foster and maintain confidence in the financial services industry in the DIFC;*

(...)

(d) *to prevent, detect and restrain conduct that causes or may cause damage to the reputation of the DIFC or the financial services industry in the DIFC, through appropriate means including the imposition of sanctions;*

(e) *to protect direct and indirect users and prospective users of the financial services industry in the DIFC;*

(...)

Other relevant extracts from the Regulatory Law 2004 are set out below.

#### **41. *The Financial Services Prohibition***

(1) *Subject to Article 41(9) and Article 42(3), a person shall not carry on a Financial Service in or from the DIFC.*

(2) *The DFSA shall make Rules prescribing the activities which constitute a Financial Service.*

(3) *The prohibition in Article 41(1) is referred to in the Law as the "Financial Services Prohibition".*

(4) *The DFSA may make Rules adding to, removing activities from, or otherwise modifying the list of Financial Services made under Article 41(2).*

(5) *A person shall, in engaging in activity constituting a Financial Service, or in engaging in any like activity that may constitute a Financial Service except for*

*the form and manner in which the activity is carried out, comply with Federal Law to the extent that such law applies in the DIFC.*

(6) *DELETED*

(7) *DELETED*

(8) *DELETED*

(9) *A Fund is exempt from the Financial Services Prohibition with respect to any Financial Service which is carried on for the purposes of, or in connection with, the Fund if the Fund has a Fund Manager or External Fund Manager that falls within Article 42(3) (a) or (b). This exemption applies to a Fund even where it does not have legal personality.*

#### **41A. Financial Promotions Prohibition**

- (1) *A person shall not make a Financial Promotion in or from the DIFC except as prescribed by the Rules made pursuant to this Article.*
- (2) *The prohibition in Article 41A(1) is referred to as the “Financial Promotions Prohibition”.*
- (3) *For the purposes of the Financial Promotions Prohibition, a Financial Promotion is any communication, however made, which invites or induces a Person to:*
  - (a) *enter into, or offer to enter into, an agreement in relation to the provision of a financial service; or*
  - (b) *exercise any rights conferred by a financial product or acquire, dispose of, underwrite or convert a financial product.*
- (4) *For the purposes of the Financial Promotions Prohibition, the DFSA may make Rules as to:*
  - (a) *a person or class of persons who may make a Financial Promotion in or from the DIFC and any requirements which apply to such persons when doing so; and*
  - (b) *any other definition, requirement or matter which the DFSA considers necessary to give effect to the requirements or intent of the Financial Promotions Prohibition.*

#### **41B. General prohibition against misconduct**

- (1) *A person must not, in or from the DIFC, engage in conduct in connection with a Financial Product or a Financial Service that is:*
  - (a) *misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive;*
  - (b) *fraudulent; or*
  - (c) *dishonest.*

- (2) *The DFSA shall make Rules prescribing what constitutes a Financial Product for the purposes of Article 41B (1).*
- (3) *Nothing in this Article limits the scope or application of any other provision in legislation administered by the DFSA.*

**42. *Authorised Firms, Authorised Market Institutions and Financial Services***

- (1) *The DFSA shall make Rules prescribing which kinds of Financial Services, with such modifications or limitations as may be specified may be carried on by:*
  - (a) *an Authorised Firm; and*
  - (b) *an Authorised Market Institution.*
- (2) *The DFSA may make Rules adding to, removing activities from, or otherwise modifying the lists of Financial Services prescribed under Article 42(1).*
- (3) *A person may carry on one or more Financial Services in or from the DIFC if such person is:*
  - (a) *an Authorised Firm whose Licence authorises it to carry on the relevant Financial Services;*
  - (b) *an External Fund Manager as defined in Article 20(5) of the Collective Investment Law 2010, in so far as its activities relate to a particular Domestic Fund that falls within Article 41(9); or*
  - (c) *an Authorised Market Institution whose Licence authorises it to carry on the relevant Financial Services.*
- (4) *An Authorised Firm or Authorised Market Institution shall:*
  - (a) *act within the scope of its authority under its Licence; and*
  - (b) *comply with any condition or restriction applicable to its Licence.*
- (5) *A person who is not an Authorised Firm or Authorised Market Institution shall not represent that he is such a person.*

.....

**59. Restricting persons from performing functions in the DIFC**

- (1) *If the DFSA believes on reasonable grounds that a person is not a fit and proper person to perform any functions in connection with the provision of Financial Services in or from the DIFC, it may restrict the person from performing all or any such functions.*
- (2) *A restriction under this Article may relate to a function whether or not it is a Licensed Function.*
- (3) *The DFSA may vary or withdraw a restriction imposed under this Article.*
- (4) *A person who performs a function in breach of a restriction under this Article commits a contravention.*
- (5) *The procedures in Schedule 3 apply to a decision of the DFSA under Article 59(1).*
- (6) *If the DFSA decides to exercise its power under Article 59(1), the person may refer the matter to the FMT for review.*

.....

**PART 6: CONTRAVENTIONS AND FINES**

**85. General Contravention Provision**

- (1) *A person who:*
  - (a) *does an act or thing that the person is prohibited from doing by or under the Law, Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA;*
  - (b) *does not do an act or thing that the person is required or directed to do by or under the Law, Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA; or*
  - (c) *otherwise contravenes a provision of the Law, Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA;*

*commits a contravention of the Law, Rules or other legislation, as the case may be, by virtue of Article 85 unless another provision of the Law, Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA provides that the person commits, or does not commit, a contravention.*

- (2) *In Article 85, 'person' does not include the DFSA or the President.*

## **86. Involvement in contraventions**

- (1) *If a person is knowingly concerned in a contravention of the Law or Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA committed by another person, the aforementioned person as well as the other person commits a contravention and is liable to be proceeded against and dealt with accordingly.*
- (2) *If an officer of a body corporate is knowingly concerned in a contravention of the Law or Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA committed by a body corporate, the officer as well as the body corporate commits a contravention and is liable to be proceeded against and dealt with accordingly.*
- (3) *If the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its members, Article 86(2) applies in relation to the acts and defaults of a member in connection with his functions of management as if he were a director of the body corporate.*
- (4) *If a partner (or a person purporting to act as a partner) is knowingly concerned in a contravention of the Law or Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA committed by a partnership or by all or some of its constituent partners, he as well as the partnership or its constituent partners as the case may be commits a contravention and is liable to be proceeded against and dealt with accordingly.*
- (5) *If an officer of an unincorporated association (other than a partnership) or a member of its governing body is knowingly concerned in a contravention of the Law or Rules or other legislation administered by the DFSA committed by the association, that officer or member as well as the association commits a contravention and is liable to be proceeded against and dealt with accordingly.*
- (6) *For the purposes of Article 86, "officer" means a director, member of a committee of management, chief executive, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or association, or a person purporting to act in such capacity, and an individual who is a controller of the body.*
- (7) *For the purposes of Article 86, a person is 'knowingly concerned' in a contravention if, and only if, the person*
  - (a) *has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention;*
  - (b) *has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention;*
  - (c) *has in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, been knowingly involved in or been party to, the contravention; or*
  - (d) *has conspired with another or others to effect the contravention.*

- (8) *In Article 86, 'person' does not include the DFSA or President.*

.....

## **90. Sanctions and directions**

- (1) *Where the DFSA considers that a person has contravened a provision of any legislation administered by the DFSA, other than in relation to Article 32, the DFSA may exercise one or more of the powers in Article 90(2) in respect of that person.*
- (2) *For the purposes of Article 90(1) the DFSA may:*
- (a) *fine the person such amount as it considers appropriate in respect of the contravention;*
  - (b) *censure the person in respect of the contravention;*
  - (c) *make a direction requiring the person to effect restitution or compensate any other person in respect of the contravention within such period and on such terms as the DFSA may direct;*
  - (d) *make a direction requiring the person to account for, in such form and on such terms as the DFSA may direct, such amounts as the DFSA determines to be profits or unjust enrichment arising from the contravention;*
  - (e) *make a direction requiring the person to cease and desist from such activity constituting or connected to the contravention as the DFSA may stipulate;*
  - (f) *make a direction requiring the person to do an act or thing to remedy the contravention or matters arising from the contravention; or*
  - (g) *make a direction prohibiting the person from holding office in or being an employee of any Authorised Person, DNFBP, Reporting Entity or Domestic Fund.*
- (...)
- (5) *If the DFSA decides to exercise its power under this Article in relation to a person, the person may refer the matter to the FMT for review.*

## **Collective Investment Law - DIFC Law No. 2 of 2010 (Collective Investment Law 2010)**

### **PART 2: DEFINITIONS**

#### **Chapter 1: Collective Investment Funds**

#### **11. Arrangements constituting a Collective Investment Fund**

- (1) *A Collective Investment Fund ("Fund") is, subject to Article 12, any arrangements with respect to property of any description, including money, where:*
- (a) *the purpose or effect of the arrangements is to enable persons taking part in the arrangements (whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or*

*otherwise) to participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income;*

- (b) the arrangements must be such that the persons who are to participate (“Unitholders”) in the arrangements do not have day-to-day control over the management of the property, whether or not they have the right to be consulted or to give directions; and*
  - (c) the arrangements have either or both of the following characteristics:*
    - (i) the contributions of the Unitholders and the profits or income out of which payments are to be made to them are pooled; or*
    - (ii) the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the Fund Manager.*
- (2) If the arrangements provide for such pooling as is mentioned in Article 11(1)(c)(i) in relation to separate parts of the property, the arrangement is not to be regarded as constituting a single Fund unless the Unitholders are entitled to exchange rights in one part for rights in another.*

## **12. Arrangements not constituting a Collective Investment Fund**

*The DFSA may, by Rules, specify when arrangements or types of arrangements that meet the definition of a Fund in Article 11(1) do not constitute a Fund.*

## **Chapter 2: Types of Funds and relevant criteria**

### **13. Domestic and Foreign Funds**

- (1) A Fund is either a Domestic Fund or a Foreign Fund.*
- (2) A Fund is a Domestic Fund if it is either:*
  - (a) established or domiciled in the DIFC; or*
  - (b) an External Fund as defined in Article 14(1).*
- (3) A Fund that does not meet the Domestic Fund criteria in Article 13(2) is a Foreign Fund.*

### **14. An External Fund**

- (1) An External Fund is a Fund which is:*
  - (a) established or domiciled in a jurisdiction other than the DIFC; and*
  - (b) managed by a Fund Manager which is an Authorised Firm.*
- (2) The requirements relating to Domestic Funds do not apply to an External Fund except to the extent otherwise provided in this Law or the Rules.*

## **19. Definition of an Offer of Units**

- (1) *An “Offer” of a Unit of a Fund constitutes any one or more of the activities specified in Article 19(2) and such activities may also be referred to as “marketing” of Units of Funds.*
- (2) *A person is to be regarded as making an Offer of a Unit if he:*
  - (a) *makes an offer to another person which, if accepted, would give rise to a contract for the issue or sale of Units by him or by another person with whom he has made arrangements for the issue or sale of the Units; or*
  - (b) *invites another person to make an offer which, if accepted by him, would give rise to a contract for the issue or sale of Units by him or by another person with whom he has made arrangements for the issue or sale of the Units,*

*whether or not the offer or invitation referred to in Article 19(2)(a) or (b) is made by way of a financial promotion of the Units.*
- (3) *For the purposes of Article 19(2), a “financial promotion” includes an advertisement or any other form of promotion, marketing or inducement inviting a person to:*
  - (a) *enter into an agreement;*
  - (b) *offer to enter into an agreement; or*
  - (c) *exercise any rights conferred by a Unit*

*to acquire, dispose of, underwrite or convert a Unit.*
- (4) *In Article 19(3), the financial promotion may be communicated in any manner including, but not limited to, the following:*
  - (a) *orally;*
  - (b) *electronically; or*
  - (c) *in writing.*
- (5) *For the purposes of Article 19(2) and (3), where a Fund Manager of a Listed Fund discloses information in accordance with the requirements of the Markets Law 2012 or the Rules made for the purposes of that law, disclosure of such information is not a financial promotion provided the disclosure of the information does not:*
  - (a) *include an express invitation or offer; or*
  - (b) *expressly encourage a person;*

*to engage in any of the activities specified in Article 19(2) (a) or (b).*

## **PART 3: ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FUND MANAGER AND TRUSTEE**

### **Chapter 1: General prohibitions**

#### **20. Fund Manager**

- (1) *A person shall not manage a Domestic Fund unless:*
- (a) *that person:*
    - (i) *is a body corporate;*
    - (ii) *is an Authorised Firm whose Licence authorises it to act as the Fund Manager of the particular type or specialist class of the Fund; and*
    - (iii) *meets any additional criteria, requirements or conditions that may be prescribed in the Rules;*
- or*
- (b) *the person is an External Fund Manager.*
- (2) *For the purposes of this Law, any other DFSA administered law and any rules made for the purposes of those laws, the person who “manages” a Fund, subject to Article 20(3), is the person who:*
- (a) *is legally accountable to the Unitholders in the Fund for the management of the Fund, including the property held for or within the Fund (“Fund Property”); and*
  - (b) *establishes, manages or otherwise operates or winds up the Fund.*
- (3) *The DFSA may, by Rules, prescribe when a person who engages in any of the activities specified in Article 20(2) is not managing a Fund.*
- (4) *A person referred to in Article 20(1)(a) or (b) is a “Fund Manager” and a reference to a “Fund Manager” in this Law or in any other DIFC Law or any legislation made for the purposes of such laws includes both persons, unless otherwise provided.*
- (5) *A person is an External Fund Manager if that person:*
- (a) *is a body corporate;*
  - (b) *manages a Domestic Fund:*
    - (i) *which is not an External Fund; and*
    - (ii) *which is excluded from the Financial Services Prohibition under Article 41(9) of the Regulatory Law 2004; and*
  - (c) *manages the Fund in (b):*
    - (i) *from a place of business in a Recognised Jurisdiction or a jurisdiction otherwise acceptable to the DFSA; and*
    - (ii) *in accordance with any additional requirements prescribed by the DFSA for the purposes of this Article.*

.....

## **PART 7: MARKETING OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FUNDS**

### **Chapter 1: General**

#### **50. Marketing prohibition**

- (1) *Subject to Article 50(2), a person shall not, in or from the DIFC, Offer a Unit of a Fund to a prospective or existing Unitholder unless:*
  - (a) *a Prospectus that complies with the requirements in this Law and the Rules made for the purposes of this Law is made available to such a Unitholder;*
  - (b) *the person making the Offer is either the Fund Manager of the Fund or an Authorised Firm whose Licence authorises it do so; and*
  - (c) *the Offer is made in accordance with the requirements in this Law and the Rules made for the purposes of this Law.*
- (2) *The DFSA may, by Rules, exempt any person or class of persons from the prohibition in Article 50(1) and in doing so, may subject such person or class of persons to any conditions it considers appropriate.*
- (3) *A Prospectus includes, except where expressly stated otherwise:*
  - (a) *an Information Memorandum in respect of an Offer of a Unit of an Exempt Fund or a Qualified Investor Fund;*
  - (b) *a Supplementary or Replacement Prospectus; and*
  - (c) *in the case of an External Fund or Foreign Fund, the Units of which are marketed in or from the DIFC, any prospectus or other disclosure document prepared in accordance with the laws applicable to that External Fund or Foreign Fund.*

.....

### **Chapter 4: Misconduct in relation to Domestic and Foreign Funds**

#### **56. Misleading and deceptive statements**

- (1) *A person shall not make an Offer of Units if there is:*
  - (a) *a misleading or deceptive statement in:*
    - (i) *the relevant Prospectus;*
    - (ii) *any application form that accompanies the relevant Prospectus; or*
    - (iii) *any other document that relates to the Offer, or the application form;*
  - (b) *an omission from any document specified in Article 56(1)(a) of information that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not misleading or deceptive; or*

- (c) *a new circumstance that under the Law or the Rules requires a Supplementary or Replacement Prospectus to be published or issued and this has not been published or issued.*
- (2) *A person shall not, in or from the DIFC, make a misleading or deceptive statement in relation to a Fund or in connection with an Offer of Units, whether in the DIFC or elsewhere.*
- (3) *This Article does not apply to conduct which occurs outside the DIFC unless the conduct affects the DIFC markets or users of the DIFC markets.*

**57. Defences to misconduct**

- (1) *A person does not commit a contravention of Article 56, if that person proves that he:*
  - (a) *made all inquiries that were reasonable in the circumstances; and*
  - (b) *after doing so, believed on reasonable grounds that the statement or omission was not misleading or deceptive.*
- (2) *A person does not commit a contravention of Article 56, if that person proves that reasonable reliance was placed on information given to that person by:*
  - (a) *if the person is a body corporate, someone other than a director, employee or agent of that body corporate; or*
  - (b) *if the person is a natural person, someone other than an employee or agent of that individual.*
- (3) *For the purposes of Article 57(2), a person does not become an agent of another person simply because he performs a particular professional or advisory function for the person.*

**SCHEDULE 1: INTERPRETATION**

.....

**3. Defined Terms**

<i>Terms</i>	<b><i>Definitions</i></b>
(...)	
<i>Unit</i>	<i>a Unit or share representing the rights or interests of Unitholders in a Fund and includes a right or interest in such a Unit.</i>

.....

**2. RELEVANT DFSA RULEBOOK PROVISIONS**

**Collective Investment Rules (CIR)**

**2 ARRANGEMENTS NOT CONSTITUING A COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT FUND**

**2.1 Exclusions**

(...)

### **Bodies corporate not undertaking investment management**

**2.1.10** *An arrangement does not constitute a Collective Investment Fund if the arrangement comprises a closed-ended Partnership or Body Corporate, unless on reasonable grounds the purpose or effect of such an arrangement appears to be the investment management, in the exercise of discretion for a collective purpose, of Investments or Real Property for the benefit of the shareholders or partners.*

.....

### **Private Equity Fund**

**3.1.6** *A Fund is a Private Equity Fund if it;*

- (a) invests in unlisted companies, by means of Shares, convertible debt or other instruments carrying equity participation rights or reward; or*
- (b) participates in management buy-outs or buy-ins.*

## **15 MARKETING OF FOREIGN FUNDS**

### **15.1 Access to Foreign Funds and availability of Prospectus**

#### ***Guidance***

- 1. Rules 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 exclude from being treated as Offers any Transactions undertaken by an Authorised Firm where such Transactions are Execution-only Transactions, or Transactions for the purposes of managing a Discretionary Portfolio for a Client, or for the purposes of redeeming a Unit of a Fund for a Client. Similarly, an offer made by an Authorised Firm to a Market Counterparty is also excluded from being an Offer. As a result, such excluded Transactions and offers do not attract the marketing prohibition in Article 50 of the Law and the requirements in both the Law and this module relating to the marketing of Units.*
- 2. ....*
- 3. Under Article 54(2) of the Law, the DFSA has the power to prescribe any additional criteria, requirements or conditions that apply to the Offer of Units of a Foreign Fund, including disclosure that must be included in a Prospectus and the legal form and structure of the Fund such as being open-ended or closed ended or listed or not. This section contains additional criteria and requirements prescribed pursuant to Article 54(2) of the Law.*

(...)

### **Prospectus disclosure relating to Foreign Funds**

**15.1.2** *Where an Authorised Firm Offers a Unit of a Foreign Fund to a Person, it must make available to that Person a copy of a current Prospectus relating to the Fund which complies with the additional requirements in Rule 15.1.3 at the time of the Offer.*

### **Guidance**

*Under Article 50(3)(c) of the Law, a Prospectus includes, in the case of a Foreign Fund the Units of which are marketed in or from the DIFC, any prospectus or other disclosure document prepared in accordance with the laws applicable to that Foreign Fund.*

- (4) **15.1.3** (1) *The Prospectus of a Foreign Fund made available by an Authorised Firm must be in the English language.*
- (5) (2) *The Prospectus must contain in a prominent position, or have attached to it, a statement that clearly:*
- (a) *describes the foreign jurisdiction and the legislation in that jurisdiction that applies to the Fund;*
  - (b) *states the name of the relevant Financial Services Regulator in that jurisdiction;*
  - (c) *describes the regulatory status accorded to the Fund by that Regulator;*
  - (d) *includes the following warning:*  
  
*“This Prospectus relates to a Fund which is not subject to any form of regulation or approval by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (“DFSA”).*  
  
*The DFSA has no responsibility for reviewing or verifying any Prospectus or other documents in connection with this Fund. Accordingly, the DFSA has not approved this Prospectus or any other associated documents nor taken any steps to verify the information set out in this Prospectus, and has no responsibility for it.*  
  
*The Units to which this Prospectus relates may be illiquid and/or subject to restrictions on their resale. Prospective purchasers should conduct their own due diligence on the Units.*  
  
*If you do not understand the contents of this document you should consult an authorised financial adviser.”;*
  - (e) *if the Offer is not directed to Retail Clients, includes a prominent statement to that effect to be incorporated within the warning in (d); and*
  - (f) *in the case of an Offer of a Unit in a Money Market Fund, contains the risk warning referred to in Rule 14.4.7.*

- 15.1.4** *An Authorised Firm which makes an Offer of a Unit of a Foreign Fund must maintain at its place of business or other designated location in the DIFC copies of the relevant Prospectus for inspection by Clients and by the DFSA during normal business hours.*

### **Guidance**

*In relation to Rule 15.1.4, copies of the Prospectus may be stored electronically so long as Clients and the DFSA have ready and immediate access.*

## **General Module (GEN)**

## **2.2 Financial Service activities**

**2.2.1** *An activity constitutes a Financial Service under the Regulatory Law and these Rules where:*

- (a) it is an activity specified in Rule 2.2.2; and*
- (b) such activity is carried on by way of business in the manner described in section 2.3.*

**2.2.2** *The following activities are specified for the purposes of Rule 2.2.1:*

- (a) Accepting Deposits;*
- (b) Providing Credit;*
- (c) Providing Money Services;*
- (d) Dealing in Investments as Principal;*
- (e) Dealing in Investments as Agent;*
- (f) Arranging Deals in Investments;*
- (g) Managing Assets;*
- (h) Advising on Financial Products;*
- (i) Managing a Collective Investment Fund;*
- (j) Providing Custody;*
- (k) Arranging Custody;*
- (l) Effecting Contracts of Insurance;*
- (m) Carrying Out Contracts of Insurance;*
- (n) Operating an Exchange;*
- (o) Operating a Clearing House;*
- (p) Insurance Intermediation;*
- (q) Insurance Management;*
- (r) Managing a Profit Sharing Investment Account;*
- (s) Operating an Alternative Trading System;*
- (t) Providing Trust Services;*

- (u) *Providing Fund Administration;*
- (v) *Acting as the Trustee of a Fund;*
- (w) *Operating a Representative Office;*
- (x) *Operating a Credit Rating Agency;*
- (y) *Arranging Credit and Advising on Credit; and*
- (z) *Operating a Crowdfunding Platform.*

***Guidance***

*Note that the ambit of these activities in Rule 2.2.2 may be restricted under COB, AMI or REP and may be fettered by the continuing operation of the Federal Law.*

**2.2.3** *Each activity specified in Rule 2.2.2:*

- (a) *is to be construed in the manner provided under these Rules; and*
- (b) *is subject to exclusions under these Rules which may apply to such an activity.*

.....

**2.3** ***By way of business***

**2.3.1** *Subject to Rules 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, for the purpose of these Rules a Person carries on an activity by way of business if the Person:*

- (a) *engages in the activity in a manner which in itself constitutes the carrying on of a business;*
- (b) *holds himself out as willing and able to engage in that activity; or*
- (c) *regularly solicits other Persons to engage with him in transactions constituting that activity.*

.....

**2.9** ***Arranging deals in investments***

**2.9.1** (1) *In Rule 2.2.2, Arranging Deals in Investments means making arrangements with a view to another Person buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting an Investment (whether that other Person is acting as principal or agent).*

- (2) *The arrangements in (1) include:*
  - (a) *arrangements which do not bring about the transaction; and*

- (b) *arrangements comprising or involving the receipt and transmission of Client orders in relation to Investments.*
- (3) *The arrangements in (1) do not include arrangements which amount to Operating an Alternative Trading System.*
- (4) *In this Rule and in Rules 2.9.2 to 2.9.7, an “Investment” includes rights under a contract of Long-Term Insurance, that is not a contract of reinsurance.*

.....

## **2.12 Managing a collective investment fund**

**2.12.1** (1) *In Rule 2.2.2, Managing a Collective Investment Fund means:*

- (a) *being legally accountable to the Unitholders in the Fund for the management of the property held for or within a Fund under the Fund’s Constitution; and*
- (b) *establishing, managing or otherwise operating or winding up a Collective Investment Fund; and*
- (2) *To the extent that any activity under (1) constitutes Managing Assets, Providing Fund Administration, Dealing as Agent, Dealing as Principal, Arranging Deals in Investments, or Providing Custody, such a Financial Service is taken to be incorporated within Managing a Collective Investment Fund.*
- (3) *The Person referred to in (1) is a Fund Manager.*

.....

## **2A. DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL PRODUCT IN THE GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST MISCONDUCT**

***Definition of Financial Product in the general prohibition against misconduct.***

**2A.1.1** *For the purposes of Article 41B of the Regulatory Law, a “Financial Product” means an Investment, a Credit Facility, a Deposit, a Profit Sharing Investment Account or a Contract of Insurance or a Crowdfunding Loan Agreement.*

.....

## **CHAPTER 3 - FINANCIAL PROMOTIONS**

### **3.3 Definition of a Financial Product**

**3.3.1** *Pursuant to Article 41A(4) of the Regulatory Law, “financial product” in Article 41A(3)(b) of the Regulatory Law is hereby prescribed to mean an Investment, a Credit Facility, a Deposit, a Profit Sharing Investment Account, or a Contract of Insurance or a Crowdfunding Loan Agreement.*

....

### **3.4 Scope of the Financial Promotions Prohibition**

- 3.4.1** (1) *A Person shall not, subject to (2) and (3), make a Financial Promotion in or from the DIFC unless that Person is an Authorised Person.*
- (2) *A Representative Office may make a Financial Promotion in or from the DIFC only in relation to a financial service or financial product offered:*
- (a) *in a jurisdiction other than the DIFC; and*
  - (b) *by a related party (as defined in Rule 2.26.1(3)) of the Representative Office.*
- (3) *A Person other than an Authorised Person may make a Financial Promotion in or from the DIFC if, and only to the extent that, the Person:*
- (a) *is licensed and supervised by a Financial Services Regulator in the UAE;*
  - (b) *is a Recognised Body or External Fund Manager;*
  - (c) *is a Reporting Entity and makes a Financial Promotion in or from the DIFC exclusively for the purpose of discharging its mandatory disclosure requirements; or*
  - (d) *makes an exempt Financial Promotion as specified in (4).*
- (4) *For the purposes of (3)(d), a communication is an “exempt Financial Promotion” if it is:*
- (a) *approved by an Authorised Firm other than a Representative Office;*
  - (b) *approved by a Representative Office and it is a communication relating to a financial service or financial product offered by a related party (as defined in Rule 2.26.1(3)) of the Representative Office;*
  - (c) *directed at and capable of acceptance exclusively by a Person who appears on reasonable grounds to be a Professional Client of the type specified in COB Rule 2.3.4;*
  - (d) *made to a Person in the DIFC (the “recipient”) as a result of an unsolicited request by the recipient to receive the Financial Promotion;*
  - (e) *made or issued by or on behalf of a government or non-commercial government entity; or*
  - (f) *made in the DIFC by a Person in the course of providing legal or accountancy services and may reasonably be regarded as incidental to and a necessary part of the provision of such services.*

### **Guidance**

*If a Person proposes to conduct Financial Promotions in or from the DIFC other than as permitted under (3) and (4), that Person should consider obtaining an appropriate Licence.*

.....

## **CHAPTER 4 – CORE PRINCIPLES**

### **4.2 The Principles for Authorised Firms**

(...)

#### **Principle 6 - Information and interests**

**4.2.6** *An Authorised Firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.*

.....

### **4.4 The Principles for Authorised Individuals**

#### **Principle 1 - Integrity**

**4.4.1** *An Authorised Individual must observe high standards of integrity and fair dealing in carrying out every Licensed Function.*

.....

## **APP2 INVESTMENTS**

### **A2.1 General definition of investments**

#### **Investments**

**A2.1.1 (1)** *An Investment is, subject to (3), either:*

- (a) *a Security; or*
- (b) *a Derivative,*

*as defined in Rule A2.1.2 or Rule A2.1.3.*

(2) *Such a Security or Derivative includes:*

- (a) *a right or interest in the relevant Security or Derivative; and*
- (b) *any instrument declared as a Security or Derivative pursuant to Rule A2.4.1(1).*

(3) *Where a Rule provides that a Security or Derivative has a different classification for a specified purpose, it shall have that effect for that specified purpose and no other purpose.*

### **Guidance**

*An example of the application of Rule A2.1.1 (3) is Rule A2.1.2(2), where a Derivative is treated as a Security for the purposes of the requirements in PIB.*

### **Security**

**A2.1.2** (1) For the purposes of Rule A2.1.1(1)(a), a Security is:

(a) a Share;

(...)

(e) a Unit; ...

(...)

### **A2.2 Definitions of specific securities**

**A2.2.1** For the purposes of Rule A2.1.2:

#### **Shares**

(a) a Share is a share or stock in the share capital of any Body Corporate or any unincorporated body but excluding a Unit;

(...)

#### **Units**

(e) a Unit is a unit in or a share representing the rights or interests of a Unitholder in a Fund; ...

.....

### **Conduct of Business Module (COB)**

**CHAPTER 3 - CORE RULES – INVESTMENT BUSINESS, ACCEPTING DEPOSITS, PROVIDING CREDIT, PROVIDING TRUST SERVICES AND OPERATING A CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM**

.....

### **3.2 Communication of information and marketing material**

#### **General**

**3.2.1** When communicating information to a Person in relation to a financial product or financial service, an Authorised Firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that the communication is clear, fair and not misleading.

### **3. OTHER RELEVANT REGULATORY PROVISIONS**

Chapter 4 of the DFSA's Regulatory Policy and Process Rulebook (RPP) (February 2017

Edition) provides information on how the DFSA will generally exercise its powers when conducting supervisory or enforcement activities.

The DFSA's policy in relation to its approach to enforcement is set out in Chapter 5 of RPP.

Chapter 6 of RPP sets out the DFSA's approach to imposing a penalty, which includes a financial penalty, and the matters the DFSA will take into account when determining a penalty.

## ANNEX C – DEFINITIONS

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AI Masah Cayman	AI Masah Capital Limited, a Cayman Islands company, first mentioned in paragraph 2 above.
AI Masah DIFC	AI Masah Capital Management Limited, a company which was incorporated in the DIFC on 9 August 2010 and licensed by the DFSA on 19 August 2010, first mentioned in paragraph 2 above.
AI Masah Model	The business arrangements in which AI Masah DIFC, AI Masah Cayman and others were concerned, as described in paragraphs 12 to 23 above.
ANEL	AI Najah Education Limited, the Investment Company in the Education Fund.
CIL	Collective Investment Law 2010 (DIFC Law No 2 of 2010), as amended from time to time.
CIR	DFSA Rulebook, Collective Investment Rules Module (versions 13 to 19 inclusive, as in force from time to time during the Relevant Period).
COB	DFSA Rulebook, Conduct of Business Module (versions 19 to 25 inclusive, as in force from time to time during the Relevant Period).
Distributor B	The relevant distributor referred to in paragraph 36(2) above.
Education Fund	The Platform, as described in Table 1 after paragraph 14 above, that included the Operational Company named AI Najah Education LLC and the Investment Company named AI Najah Education Limited.
Enforcement	The DFSA Enforcement Division.
Financial Projections	The estimated budget and profits for the Platform, which formed part of the Marketing Material, as described in paragraph 25 above.
Fine	The fine of US\$150,000 imposed on Mr. Singhdeo in this Notice, first mentioned in paragraph 1 above.

GEN	Unless otherwise indicated, this means the DFSA Rulebook, General Module (versions 27 to 36 inclusive, as in force from time to time during the Relevant Period).
GLO	DFSA Rulebook, Glossary Module (versions 23 to 34 inclusive, as in force from time to time during the Relevant Period).
Healthcare Fund	The Platform, as described in Table 1 after paragraph 14 above, that included the Operational Company named Alchemist Healthcare LLC and the Investment Company named Avivo Group.
Investment Company	The company which, along with an Operational Company, comprised a Platform, as described in paragraph 14 above. Investors in the AI Masah Model purchased Platform Shares of the Investment Company, which controlled, and held the beneficial interest in, the Operational Company.
Investors	The natural persons and legal persons to whom investments in the Platforms in the AI Masah Model were marketed.
Investor A, Investor C	The relevant investors as described in paragraphs 36(1) and 37(2) above.
Lifestyle Fund	The Platform, as described in Table 1 after paragraph 14 above, that included the Operational Company named DLL Emirates Restaurants LLC and the Investment Company named Diamond Lifestyle Limited.
Logistics Fund	The Platform, as described in Table 1 after paragraph 14 above, that included the Operational Company named Gulf Pinnacle Investments LLC and the Investment Company named Gulf Pinnacle Logistics Limited.
Management Agreements	The agreements entered into between each Investment Company and AI Masah Cayman, as described in paragraph 22 above.
Marketing Material	The marketing material distributed to prospective Investors in the AI Masah Model as described in paragraph 25 above.
Mr. Dash	Shailesh Kumar Dash.

Mr. Lim	Don Lim Jung Chiat.
Mr. Singhdeo	Nrupaditya Singhdeo.
Notice	This Decision Notice.
Operational Company	The company which, along with an Investment Company, comprised a Platform, as described in paragraph 14 above. Each Operational Company invested in various arrangements and businesses within a particular sector of the economy.
Placement Fee	The fee, payable to AI Masah Cayman by each Investment Company pursuant to a Placement Fee Agreement, of up to 10% of the capital raised from new Investors, as described in paragraph 23 above.
Placement Fee Agreement	The agreement by which each Investment Company engaged AI Masah Cayman to help it raise equity capital at a premium to its par value and to pay AI Masah Cayman a Placement Fee, as described in paragraph 23 above.
Platforms	The investment platforms marketed to Investors in the AI Masah Model, comprising of an Investment Company and an Operational Company, as described in paragraph 14 above.
Platform Shares	The Shares and/or rights in the Shares of one or more of the Investment Companies, as described in paragraph 14 above.
Regulatory Law	Regulatory Law 2004 (DIFC Law No 1 of 2004), as amended from time to time.
Relevant Period	August 2010 to June 2016.
Subscription Form	The form, which was part of the Marketing Material, whereby the prospective investor could invest in the Platform, as described in paragraph 31 above.

## ANNEX D – TABLE OF RELEVANT MARKETING MATERIAL

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
Subscription Form -2012.docx.pdf	2012	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
Subscription Form -2012 institutional.docx.pdf	2012	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document.pdf	Jan-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML V6.pdf	Jan-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Mar 2012.pdf	Mar-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Apr 2012.pdf	Apr-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - June 2013(2).pdf	Jun-12	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document June 2012.pdf	Jun-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	EXH-620	No
HML Offering Document 25th Sept 2012.pdf	Sep-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Sept 2012.pdf	Sep-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Oct 2012 v4.pdf	Oct-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Oct 2012.pdf	Oct-12	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Offering Jan 2013.pdf	Jan-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Jan 2013.pdf	Jan-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
Subscription Form 28-2-2013.pdf	Feb-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Offering Doc Mar 2013.pdf	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Offering Doc Mar 2013.pdf	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCM L	No	-	No
AI Najah Teaser March 2013.docx	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCM L	No	EXH-636 (pg 3-5)	No

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
AI Najah Teaser March 2013.pdf	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Mar 2013(2).pdf	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Mar 2013.pdf	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Mar 2013.pptx	Mar-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Investor Presentation Mar13.pdf	Mar-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Investor Presentation April 2013.pdf	Apr-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML's offering document Apr13.pdf	Apr-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
ANEL Subscription Form 2-4-2013(2).pdf	Apr-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
ANEL Subscription form 2-4-2013.pdf	Apr-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Subscription Form 2-4-2013.pdf	Apr-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Subscription Form May 2013.pdf	May-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - June 2013.docx	Jun-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - June 2013.pdf	Jun-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Teaser June 2013.pdf	Jun-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc June 2013 - Final(2).pdf	Jun-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc June 2013 - Final.pdf	Jun-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Financial model Jun13.pdf	Jun-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc July 2013.pdf	Jul-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Diamond Lifestyle Limited_Offering Memorandum Revised.pdf	Jul-13	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - Aug 2013(2).pdf	Aug-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - Aug 2013.pdf	Aug-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
AI Najah Teaser Aug 2013.pdf	Aug-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Aug 2013(2).pdf	Aug-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Aug 2013.pdf	Aug-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Education consolidated model - Aug 2013 Final.pdf	Aug-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Financial model Aug13.pdf	Aug-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Offering Document Aug13(2).pdf	Aug-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-621	No
HML Offering Document Aug13.pdf	Aug-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Teaser Aug13.pdf	Aug-13	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-636 (pg 1-2)	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - Dec 2013.pdf	Dec-13	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Dec 2013 Final(2).pdf	Dec-13	ANEL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-632	No
AN Offering Doc Dec 2013 Final.pdf	Dec-13	ANEL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Investor Presentation Dec 2013 v2.pdf	Dec-13	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Subscription Form - 14 01 14.pdf	Jan-14	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Investor Presentation - Feb 2014.pdf	Feb-14	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - Mar 2014 (6).pdf	Mar-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - Mar 2014.pdf	Mar-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation March 2014 Final.pdf	Mar-14	ANEL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Offering Doc Mar 2014 Draft AI Masar Holding.pdf	Mar-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation May 2014.pdf	May-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - May 2014.pdf	May-14	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AI Najah Education Subscription Form - Aug 2014.pdf	Aug-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
HML Offering Document Sept 2014.pdf	Sep-14	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - Sep 2014.pdf	Sep-14	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Corporate Profile_Diamond Lifestyle Limited (Brief).pdf	Sep-14	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation October 2014 General.pdf	Oct-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH 633 (page 1 -35)	No
AN Investor Presentation October 2014 with Projections.pdf	Oct-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - Financial Section - Oct 2014.pdf	Oct-14	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - General Section - Oct 2014.pdf	Oct-14	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - Oct. 2014 - Old.pdf	Oct-14	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
GPL - Financial Projections Final 9 10 14_pptx.pdf	Oct-14	GPL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
GPL - Investor Presentation_Final 9 10 14.pdf	Oct-14	GPL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-630 (pg 47 onwards)	No
GPL Financial Projections - Oct 2014.pdf	Oct-14	GPL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
GPL Subscription Form Final 09 10 14_docx.pdf	Oct-14	GPL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation December 2014 with Projections.pdf	Dec-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation December 2014.pdf	Dec-14	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
GPL Investor Presentation_Jan 2015.pdf	Jan-15	GPL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
GPL Subscription Form - Jan 15.pdf	Jan-15	GPL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
GPL Subscription Form Final 28 01 15.pdf	Jan-15	GPL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-631 (pg 27 onward)	No
HML Presentation - General Section - Feb 2015.pdf	Feb-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation March 2015 - with Projections.pdf	Mar-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation March 2015 Draft V3 - with Projections.pdf	Mar-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
AN Investor Presentation March 2015 Draft V4.pdf	Mar-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Investor Presentation March 2015.pdf	Mar-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-635	Yes
HML Presentation - Financial Section - Mar 2015.pdf	Mar-15	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
HML Presentation - General Section - Mar 2015.pdf	Mar-15	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
GPL - Financial Projections Final March 15.pdf	Mar-15	GPL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
DLL Presentation - Class A Shares - Final (updated 5Apr2015).pdf	Apr-15	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation May 2015 - with Projections.pdf	May-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation May 2015 - with Projections.pdf	May-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-630 (pg 1-15)	Yes
Draft HML Presentation - Financial Section - May 2015.pdf	May-15	HML	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
Draft HML Presentation - General Section - May 2015.pdf	May-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
HML Subscription - May 2015.pdf	May-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - Financial Section - Jul 2015.pdf	Jun-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
HML Presentation - General Section - Jul 2015.pdf	Jul-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
HML Subscription - July 2015.pdf	Jul-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Presentation - Financial Section - Sep 2015.pdf	Sep-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
HML Presentation - General Section - Sep 2015.pdf	Sep-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
HML Subscription Form - September 2015.pdf	Sep-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
DLL Financial Projections - Class A Shares.pdf	Sep-15	DLL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-630 (pg 33 - 46)	Yes
AVIVO Presentation - General Section - Sep 2015.pdf	Sep-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
Microsoft PowerPoint - DLL Presentation - Class A Shares - 16Oct2015 v2.pdf	Oct-15	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
DLL Presentation - Class A Shares - 16Oct2015(191115).pptx	Oct-15	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
AVIVO Presentation - Financial Section - Nov 2015.pdf	Nov-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-630 (pg 16 - 32)	Yes
AVIVO Presentation - General Section - Nov 2015.pdf	Nov-15	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation Dec 2015 - with Projections Final.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation Dec 2015 - with Projections Final.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation Dec 2015 Final.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation Dec 2015.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
Current AVIVO Presentation - Financial Section - Jan 2016.pdf	Jan-16	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
Current AVIVO Presentation - General Section - Jan 2016.pdf	Jan-16	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AVIVO Presentation - Financial Section - Jan 2016.pdf	Jan-16	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AVIVO Presentation - General Section - Jan 2016.pdf	Jan-16	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
Al Najah Education Subscription Form.pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Subscription Form Final (1).pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Subscription Form Final (2).pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Subscription Form Final (3).pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Subscription Form Final (4).pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Subscription Form Final (5).pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
AN Subscription Form Final.pdf	Undated	ANEL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
HML Teaser 13.pdf	Undated	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AVIVO - Subscription Agreement - 3.00.pdf	Undated	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Subscription Form.pdf	Undated	HML	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
DLL Subscription Form_Class A Shares.pdf	Undated	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-631 (Pg 20 - 26)	No

Document Name	Dated	Investment Co.	Promotional Material	Evidence of approval by AI Masah DIFC	Promoter	Placement Fees Disclosed?	Exhibit Number	"approved for distribution"
DLL Subscription Form_Class B Shares.pdf	Undated	DLL	Yes	Yes - Listed	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Class A.pdf	Undated	DLL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
Class B.pdf	Undated	DLL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	No
DLL Investor Presentation - Class A Shares.pdf	Undated	DLL	Yes	None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation Dec 2015 - with Projections Final.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL		None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Investor Presentation Dec 2015.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL		None	AMCL/AMCML	No	-	Yes
AN Subscription Form Dec 2015.pdf	Dec-15	ANEL		None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-631 (Pg 1 - 8)	No
AVIVO - Subscription Agreement - Jan 2016.pdf	Jan-16	HML		None	AMCL/AMCML	No	EXH-631 (Pg 9 - 19)	No